Symbiotic Suppression: How Digital Authoritarianism Helps Facilitate Physical Repression in Indian Controlled Kashmir by White, Patrick Aaron




Symbiotic Suppression: How Digital Authoritarianism Helps 
Facilitate Physical Repression in Indian Controlled Kashmir 
Patrick Aaron White 
University of Maine - Main, p.manwhite333@gmail.com 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/honors 
 Part of the Political Science Commons 
Recommended Citation 
White, Patrick Aaron, "Symbiotic Suppression: How Digital Authoritarianism Helps Facilitate Physical 
Repression in Indian Controlled Kashmir" (2020). Honors College. 637. 
https://digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/honors/637 
This Honors Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UMaine. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Honors College by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UMaine. For more information, 
please contact um.library.technical.services@maine.edu. 
  
SYMBIOTIC SUPPRESSION:  
HOW DIGITAL AUTHORITARIANISM HELPS FACILITATE PHYSICAL 
REPRESSION IN INDIAN CONTROLLED KASHMIR  
by 








A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment 









The Honors College 
 











 Robert Glover, Associate Professor of Political Science and Honors, Advisor 
 Asif Nawaz, Assistant Professor of History and International Affairs 
 Judith Rosenbaum, Associate Professor of Communications and Journalism 
 Amber Tierney, Assistant Professor of Sociology 
























© 2021 Patrick White 
 






Within the scholarship of authoritarianism, there is a growing assumption that as a 
regime’s access to digital means of repression increases, use of violence and other forms 
of physical state repression will be replaced and decrease. However, since India’s 
revocation of Kashmir’s special semi-autonomous status in August 2019, the nature of 
the ensuing crackdown has suggested that this understanding of modern repression may 
be incomplete—especially in light of India’s extensive use of the digital tactics that 
purportedly facilitate this transition. Through examining a broad collection of Kashmiri 
activist, survivor, journalist, and NGO accounts since August 5, 2019, this thesis 
contends that digital authoritarianism and physical repression can actually thrive 
symbiotically—offering substantial dividends for the regime at the expense of the civilian 
dissent. In particular, these findings highlight the need for future research to continue 
studying the development of “symbiotic” situations like Kashmir, as well as to begin 
identifying the ways in which international players can leverage change in this evolving 
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They're marauding our homes and hearths like a victorious army. They are now 
behaving as if they have a right over our lives, property and honor.1 
- Nazir Ahmed Bhat, Kashmiri resident 
September 2019 
 
August 4th and 5th, 2019 would become a watershed moment in the history of one 
of the most dangerous regions in the world. Jammu and Kashmir, a territory caught in the 
crossfire between two disdainful nuclear powers in India and Pakistan, was seeing the 
final fragmentary remains of its partial autonomy ripped away suddenly and violently. 
Article 370 of the Indian Constitution—the long-debated provision which afforded Indian 
controlled Jammu and Kashmir (referred to hereafter as simply “Kashmir”) this semi-
autonomous status—was scrapped by the central government, and the ensuing crackdown 
on the Kashmiri population was largely unparalleled by any previous democracy. In the 
immediate wake of the revocation, home invasions by the Indian security apparatus were 
widespread, gross human rights violations became a tool of intimidation, and thousands 
were briskly detained as the valley went into a vicious state of effective house arrest. 
Such brutal lockdowns may have historical precedence in autocratic regimes, but 
the fact that this was undertaken by a country internationally viewed as the “world’s 
largest democracy” was cause for a new level of concern. Moreover, Indian repression in 
Kashmir was by no means anything new, but this old-school authoritarian crackdown was 
being implemented with the aid of a newer autocratic tactic: an internet blackout. At this 
point in time, India already outpaced the rest of the world in its use of this practice, and 
 
1 Aijaz Hussain, “Kashmiris allege night terror by Indian troops in crackdown,” Associated Press, 
(September 14, 2019). 
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Kashmir was victim to more than two-thirds of them.2 However, the 213-day blackout 
that would follow became the longest ever imposed by a democracy, and the severing of 
digital networks meant that the Kashmiri people were now isolated from the rest of the 
world, the rest of the valley, and in many cases, from their very own families. India was 
determined to crush a movement of dissent—which would likely have been unmatched in 
Kashmir’s long history—before it could ever begin, and just as they had over hundreds of 
years of occupation and oppression, the Kashmiris would pay dearly.  
Viewing these blackouts alongside India’s blackouts is puzzling, especially due to 
an increasing assertion in the research literature on authoritarianism that these types of 
crackdowns should be subsiding. According to this line of thinking, autocrats are actively 
transitioning away from more physical means of repression thanks in large part to 
opportunities now afforded by the development of new internet technologies and 
information landscapes. In short, why take on the risks of killing one’s own people when 
the information that stirs discontent can instead be manipulated to prevent popular 
pushback? Both strategies encompass controlling a population, but the latter can be 
accomplished much less overtly than the former.  
Therefore, an important and distinct dilemma arises: there is evidence that 
dictators are increasingly turning to digital tools of repression, yet violent repression 
continues to persist as part of India’s tactical repertoire—despite its purporting to being 
the world’s largest democracy. If access to the tools and infrastructure of digital 
authoritarianism truly decrease state use of physical repression, what explains the 
 
2 Jammu and Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society, “Kashmir’s Internet Siege: an ongoing assault on digital 
rights,” n.a. (2020), https://jkccs.net/report-kashmirs-internet-siege/ 
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development of the situation in Kashmir—especially since August 2019? Is it possible 
that the global trend identified by contemporary scholars is not entirely representative of 
the reality of the ground? If so, what conclusions can be drawn about the relationship 
between digital and traditional authoritarianism? This thesis explores all of these issues, 
especially as it relates to Guriev and Treisman’s theory of “informational autocrats,” 
under the core research question: how has the availability of digital authoritarianism 
affected the Indian government’s use of violence in its suppression of the Kashmiri 
people? 
At this point, there may be one immediate pattern that is cause for confusion: why 
is India being discussed in the same context of autocrats and authoritarianism? After all, 
Freedom House still classifies the country as “Free” in its 2020 report of global 
democracy, and few would argue that the country itself resembles a government close to 
that of regional autocratic rivals like China and Russia.3 The answer is relatively 
straightforward: for all intents and purposes, Indian Kashmir is not free. In the same 2020 
report, Freedom House gives the territory a score of 28 out of 100—compared to India’s 
71 and last year’s Kashmir‘s 49—and affirms its peoples’ current reality with a “not free” 
classification.4 While the semantics of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) can be debated extensively by those focused on Hindu 
nationalism and the larger politics of the Indian subcontinent, what cannot be disputed is 
that the Kashmiris are actively being oppressed in an environment of authoritarianism 
and to act otherwise would be misinformed. Therefore, this thesis accurately 
 
3 Freedom House, “India: Freedom in the World 2020,” n.a., (2020), 
https://freedomhouse.org/country/india/freedom-world/2020. 
4 Freedom House, “Indian Kashmir: Freedom in the World 2020,” n.a., (2020), 
https://freedomhouse.org/country/indian-kashmir/freedom-world/2020. 
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contextualizes India, its security apparatus, and its central government within 
authoritarianist nomenclature like “autocrat” and “regime” regardless of whether this 
reasonably applies to the rest of India proper, and leaves this latter, separate debate for 
others to approach.  
 To start, Chapter 1 provides a theoretical framework which situates the reality in 
Kashmir within the field of authoritarianism, identifies the core components of digital 
authoritarianism, and introduces the concept of informational autocracy that becomes so 
central to the research question at large. This is followed by a literature review in Chapter 
2, which dives deeper into Guriev and Treisman’s theory, articulates the five main goals 
of autocratic regimes, and contextualizes this with reference to other states and regimes. 
Chapter 3 examines the history of Kashmir and its centuries-long struggle for 
independence, and Chapter 4 specifically analyses the events that have taken place since 
the revocation of Article 370 in 2019. From a methodological standpoint, this is largely 
accomplished by collecting sources in a manner similar to the process known as snowball 
sampling, albeit using Twitter as a specific medium for this collection. In Chapter 5, 
some of the larger questions posed by the analysis are approached in greater detail, and 
ends with the work’s conclusionary thoughts.    
As is discussed in the chapters ahead, a variety of factors makes it impossible that 
this thesis could provide a truly comprehensive account of the situation that has erupted 
in Kashmir. That said, these challenges do not diminish the importance of beginning to 
investigate the current reality, as the ensuing results have extraordinary implications for 
both the future of the Kashmir conflict as well as global democracy at large. Hopefully, 
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future research will continue to analyze the struggle in Kashmir, and start to provide 































It seems the idea that a ‘world is only a click away’ doesn’t exist for Kashmiris.5 
-Bazila Ehsan, Kashmiri PhD scholar 
August 2020 
 
 In a field as often highly contested as political science, there is one reality that is 
as close to a consensus as there will ever be: the dawn of the internet and the modern 
digital age has had a monumental impact on the political process across the board. While 
the actual manifestation of these effects has certainly been hypothesized and debated with 
no end in sight, the development of the most highly complex means of communication in 
human history has changed the way elections are held, politicians reach their constituents, 
regimes oppress their populace, and movements spur societal change. Internet 
technologies have dramatically altered the landscape of opportunities available to 
individuals, groups, and governments, and any complete, up-to-date understanding of the 
Kashmir issue must recognize and account for such factors. 
 When examining the theories of networks at the most fundamental level, it is easy 
to see how influential the internet has truly become as a means of mass communication 
and information storage. Mueller argues that networks exist in the social sciences in two 
separate, distinguishable ways: as a means of “network analysis,” as well as in an 
 
5 Safwat Zargar, “A year without high-speed internet ravaged health, education, entrepreneurship in 
Kashmir,” Scroll.in, (August 1, 2020). 
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“organizational form.”6 According to Mueller, the latter usage of the term can be broken 
down in a myriad of complex interdisciplinary fragmentations, though he identifies three 
that are particularly relevant to the literature of economic organizations and political 
science: production networks, peer production, and political networks.7 While the 
network in its organizational form is closely tied to its other iteration as a tool for 
network analysis—and certainly has inherent value in its own right—it is the first 
definition that holds the most relevance in this specific case.  
 The components of network analysis can be understood as a large web of various, 
interconnected links and nodes. In simplest terms, a node can be practically any tangible 
thing within the universe, while a link is the binding which creates the relationship 
between two nodes. For example, this type of network analysis can help explain the 
spread of a disease during a pandemic, with individual humans representing nodes while 
physical proximity acts as the vehicle in which exposure and transmission occur.8 
As it relates to communication and the spread of information, the power of the 
internet as a link between nodes is widely understood even if it is not always fully 
appreciated. To continue within the example of a pandemic, an unobstructed internet 
connection allows for the nearly instant, seamless transfer of information by a doctor in 
New York to a peer in New Delhi. While the links that made up this network certainly 
did exist at prior points in history—in the form of phone calls, telegrams, or even 
traditional “snail mail,” for example—some of these methods could take hours, weeks, or 
 
6 Milton Mueller, Networks and States: The Global Politics of Internet Governance (Cambridge: MIT 
Press: 2010), 31. 
7 Ibid, 34-38. 
8 Ibid, 33. 
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even months in a situation where speed is of the utmost importance. Looking even more 
broadly, the value of rapid, secure means of linkage is obvious for social movements 
looking to coordinate in the most efficient way—especially those under the control of 
autocratic oppression. Where in-person meetings between known dissent leaders may be 
infeasible due to physical separation by the regime’s coercive apparatus, internet 
technologies allow for the sharing of data and information that are crucial in building a 
resistance. 
This application of network analysis to the politics of social movements 
immediately raises important, pertinent questions. For example, exactly what 
opportunities do these digital tools open up to dissenters in an oppressed society? 
Likewise, can these same tools also be utilized by authoritarians in order to preserve the 
regime’s balance of power? The answer to this last question in particular is fundamental 
in order to appropriately approach the research question.  
First, the effects of internet technologies on a dissenting movement itself are 
perhaps no better exemplified than by the idea of transnational advocacy networks. 
Transnational advocacy networks, as Keck and Sikkink propose them, are specific to 
activists as opposed to economic firms or experts in a scientific field, and are formed with 
the purpose of changing the behavior of states and international organizations.9 These 
groups operate on a basis of shared values and goals, and operate both domestically as 
well as transnationally. Keck and Sikkink identify seven major actors that comprise 
advocacy networks in some combination: international and domestic nongovernmental 
 
9 Margaret Keck, Kathryn, Sikkink. Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics, 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 1-2. 
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research and advocacy organizations (NGOs); local social movements; foundations; the 
media; churches, trade unions, consumer organizations, and intellectuals; parts of 
regional and international intergovernmental organizations; and parts of the executive 
and/or parliamentary branches of governments.10 
These different actors can be more effectively understood through a process 
which Keck and Sikkink define as the boomerang pattern.11 Put simply, when the state 
denies the demands of its populations, a domestic NGO or social movement will seek to 
share information with external actors within its transnational advocacy network, who in 
turn will share information with and exert pressure on their own state and relevant 
intergovernmental organizations. If adequately convinced, these states and 
intergovernmental organizations will use their own influence to pressure the original 
country to change their course of action. While this model certainly does not guarantee 
the successful realization of a movement’s goals, it does at the very least create the 
potential for change that may very well not have existed without such networks.  
Clearly, the impact of internet technologies in this process within in authoritarian 
society can be profound. Of course, these types of transnational advocacy networks could 
certainly exist in a less digitalized world, as information can spread in a variety of 
different ways as it has for all of human history. That said, means of communication like 
text, phone, email, and social media allow information to spread exponentially more 
quickly than it ever could before, and likewise, the efficiency of today’s advocacy 
networks is simply unmatched. An autocratic state may be able to seal its physical 
borders, but as long as the internet remains accessible to members of the general 
 
10 Ibid, 9. 
11 Ibid, 13. 
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population the regime is essentially unable to stop the transfer of information abroad. For 
a state unable to weather forms of international pressure like economic sanctions, this 
could be a death sentence for regime stability.  
Theories like these demonstrate clearly that internet technologies have absolutely 
opened up opportunities to dissenters that were simply not available in the past. Taken at 
face value, such a fact may even suggest that on this basis, the existence of these 
technologies must therefore be an overall positive factor in the democratization process. 
However, this claim fails to take into account that the same characteristics that potentially 
make these technologies so powerful for social movements can also be utilized by the 
powers being rebelled against. Without a doubt, a fuller understanding of internet 
technologies from the authoritarian perspective is required in order to achieve a more 
complete analysis. 
Though Guriev and Treisman are the first to coin the specific term “informational 
autocracy” in the academic realm, there is much related literature that also aids in 
painting a clearer picture of the dynamics and motivations that drive contemporary 
autocratic regimes. Gandhi and Lust-Okar, for example, eschew traditionally broader 
scholarship to explicitly study the purposes of holding elections in a dictatorship.12 Much 
of Roberts’ work seeks to illustrate the lessons learned by regimes when implementing 
censorship, and what the potential consequences of such actions can be.13 Others such as 
Egorov and Sonin have even gone as far as to study how the size and composition of an 
 
12 Jennifer Gandhi, Ellen Lust-Okar, “Elections Under Authoritarianism,” Annual Review of Political 
Science, no. 12 (2009), 403-422. 
13 Margaret Roberts, “Resilience to Online Censorship,” Annual Review of Political Science, no, 23 (2020), 
401-419. 
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autocrat’s inner support circle can affect the overall regime’s stability.14 Guriev and 
Treisman’s most recent work stands out, though, in its ability to tie such a wide variety of 
factors under the singular umbrella of informational autocracy theory.  
In essence, the central argument Guriev and Treisman make is that autocrats 
remain in power by proving their competence to the general populace.15 While such 
leaders have a vast array of means to convince the public of this fact, the empirical 
evidence shows that modern dictators have overwhelmingly embraced nonviolent 
measures of suppression in stark contrast to their historically violent counterparts. These 
informational autocrats manipulate information rather than kill, and Guriev and Treisman 
contend that it is this transition that has allowed so many regimes to survive well into the 
twenty-first century.  
They also cite that the core threat to such a regime’s stability is the ability to 
continually manage control over the informed elite, and balance modernization without 
too greatly enabling its inherent facilitation of democratization.16 This quandary of 
modernization at the potential expense of liberalization has been recognized in academia 
as the “dictator’s dilemma,” and was brought to the political spotlight in 1985 by United 
States Secretary of State George Shultz: 
Totalitarian societies face a dilemma: either they try to stifle these 
technologies and thereby fall further behind in the new industrial 
revolution, or else they permit these technologies and see their totalitarian 
control inevitably eroded. In fact, they do not have a choice, because they 
will never be able to entirely block the tide of technological advance.17 
 
14 Georgy Egorov, Konstantin Sonin, “Dictators and Their Viziers: Endogenizing the Loyalty Competence 
Trade-off,” Journal of the European Economic Association 9, no. 2 (2011), 903-930. 
15 Sergei Guriev; Daniel Treisman, “Informational Autocrats,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 33, no. 4 
(Fall 2019), 101. 
16 Ibid, 124. 
17 George Shultz, “Shaping American Foreign Policy: New Realities and New Ways of Thinking,” Foreign 
Affairs, Spring 1985. 
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While this these words may have been largely directed at the Soviet Union near the 
turning point of the Cold War, Shultz’s sentiment rings true perhaps even more greatly 
thirty-five years later. It is nearly impossible to maintain a successful twenty-first century 
economy without the use of the internet in at least some way, and as concepts like the 
boomerang effect suggest, once this technology truly connects the public to the outside 
world a regime can quickly suffer attacks on its legitimacy. If legitimacy is severely 
undermined, in the eyes of Guriev and Treisman, a transition of power is almost 
inevitable. Hence, there is a real incentive for dictators to adopt and effectively utilize the 
strategy of informational autocracy. 
Generally in political science, the process of oppression using digital information 
technology has been termed digital authoritarianism.18 In recent years, much of the 
subject’s relevant scholarship has been focused on the exportation of such technologies 
around the world—particularly by Russia and China.19 Certainly, the tracking of such 
developments is of extreme importance as it relates to the promotion of democratic 
ideals—and likewise, the rejection of authoritarianism—around the world. However, 
some scholars have begun to push back on the way that the concept is commonly 
understood and applied. Gunitsky, for one, contends that the specific strategies typically 
associated with nondemocratic regimes are increasingly finding usage in democratic 
states as well.20 Regardless of which terminology one prefers, it is still paramount to both 
 
18 Alina Polyakova, Chris Meserole, “Exporting digital authoritarianism,” Brookings Institute, 2020. 1. 
19 Valentin Weber, “The Worldwide Web of Chinese and Russian Information Controls,” Centre for 
Technology and Global Affairs, University of Oxford, May 2019.  
20 Seva Gunitsky, “Is Digital Authoritarianism Still a Useful Concept?” University of Toronto, 2019, 
https://www.individual.utoronto.ca/seva/CNAStalk.pdf.  
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define and describe the four main strategies of digital oppression in order to fully 
recognize the threats they pose. 
Filtering 
To start, filtering is a complex process where a regime will systematically deny 
access to some—but not all—internet content. To be clear, filtering is not a technique that 
follows a uniform set of principles from country to country; instead, the practice can vary 
widely in each case due to factors such as the existing power’s priorities, degree of social 
unrest, and the technological capability of the regime.21 Though this strategy requires a 
high degree of effort to maintain due to the constant need to surveil and shift access, it 
can be considered a softer measure than its closely related “blocking” counterpart.  
Blocking 
This technique goes by many different names, and is also commonly known as an 
“internet shutdown” or “blackout.” When a regime chooses to block the internet as a 
whole, it benefits by severing the network-based means of communication across an 
entire city, region, or even the country as a whole. This can be particularly useful in 
situations where other forms of non-localized contact may be limited, or when the goal is 
to isolate a certain group of people—such as a protest. In a macro-sense, this isolation 
can also help a regime mitigate the effects of developments like the boomerang pattern as 
access to international allies, media, and NGOs are assumedly inaccessible. 
While the impacts of this bolder, more absolute tactic are far reaching—and the 
actual effectiveness heavily debated—there seems to be a few key indicators of when a 
 
21 Sebastian Hellmeier, “The Dictator’s Digital Toolkit: Explaining Variation in Internet Filtering in 
Authoritarian Regimes,” Politics & Policy 44, no. 6 (2016), 1177. 
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shutdown may occur. Primarily, the existence of conflict seems to be at the top of this 
list.22 Additionally, as the amount of foreign aid sent from the United States rises, the 
likelihood that country will blackout their internet significantly falls. Also, if a state has a 
past history of shutting down its internet—especially within the last year—it has a much 
higher chance of taking such action again than countries who have little to no blackout 
track record. 
Co-opting 
Conversely, the process of co-opting does not actually seek to limit the spread 
information at all. Instead, governments will “proactively subvert […] social media for 
their own purposes,” which typically entails the gauging of public sentiment, bolstering 
of regime legitimacy, and the enhancement of mobilization and support.23 Gunitsky 
identifies a myriad of implications stemming from this process, chiefly among them the 
fact that “citizen participation in social media may not signal regime weakness, but may 
in fact enhance regime strength and adaptability.”24 
Flooding 
The final of these four methods is known as flooding. Roberts defines this 
technique as “the promotion of information, which changes the relative costs of access by 
making competing information cheaper and off-limits information relatively more 
expensive.”25 In simplest terms, when faced with a story or event that a government may 
 
22 Elizabeth Sutterlin, “Flipping the Kill Switch: Why Governments Shut Down the Internet,” Honors 
Thesis, (William and Mary, 2020), 43-47. 
23 Gunitsky, 2. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Margaret Roberts, Censored: Distraction and Diversion Inside China’s Great Firewall, (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 2018), 193. 
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view as damaging or destabilizing, it may choose to oversaturate the information space 
with its own content to the point where the initial matter becomes exceedingly difficult to 
access—and if accessed, potentially significantly delegitimized. Gunitsky contends that 
“the goal of flooding is not to dominate the informational space but to dilute it.”26 On this 
note, it should be recognized that the use of such a tactic on a specific population is not 
necessarily confined to the leaders of the people itself: the nature of an open internet 
inherently allows for this to be weaponized by groups, organizations, and even external, 
foreign influences.  
This last point carries significance for all four tactics. For sure, use of the first two 
strategies is much rarer in democratic states than their autocratic counterparts. That said, 
the number of countries that utilized blocking alone rose from 2018 to 2019, and both 
India, the United Kingdom, and the United States were democracies that contributed to 
this trend.27 Furthermore, the final two techniques are not only existent in democracies—
their current use in countries such as the United States can be seen openly by domestic 
and foreign actors alike. In an environment where information has the ability to flow 
freely, the only thing stopping techniques like flooding and co-opting from flourishing is 
lack of action from interested parties. While this matter presents many pertinent questions 
itself, the most relevant consideration should be that the means of information 
manipulation (and depending on the lengths taken, digital oppression) are not just 
potentialities in a country connected to the web—they are current realities. 
 
26 Gunitsky, 2. 
BBerhan Taye, Targeted, Cut off, And Left in the Dark: The #KeepItOn report on internet shutdowns in 
2019, Access Now, 2020. 
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Taken altogether, it is clear that that progression of internet technologies has 
opened up new channels of opportunity to authoritarian regimes that simply had not 
existed historically. So, as it relates to the larger research question, does this mean that 
these new opportunities truly supplant the traditional means of violent state action, as 
scholars like Guriev and Treisman suggest? Or is something more sinister perhaps at 
play: the reality that these technologies may actually complement the use of violent 
repression? In the ensuing literature review, a deeper look into the empirical evidence 
demonstrates that while the former argument certainly has its merits, it is impossible to 


































The state is using a mix of harassment, intimidation, surveillance and online 
information control to silence critical voices and force journalists to resort to 
self-censorship.28 
-Ravi R Prasad, IPI Director of Advocacy 
March 2020 
 
 Guriev and Treisman’s work takes a forward role in the review of the existing 
literature as this thesis undoubtedly owes an intellectual debt to their theory of 
informational autocracy. The main scope of this thesis’ analysis is centered around 
Guriev and Treisman’s core contention that repression is on the decline throughout the 
world, and what role internet technologies play in this trend. A particularly constructive 
way of achieving this is by viewing state action through the lens of autocratic regime 
goals: namely, surveillance of dissidents, dissemination of misinformation, regime 
legitimization, creation of fear, and elimination of dissenter’s operational capacity. In 
short, if one can begin to understand the underlying intentions of an autocrat, it can then 
be reasoned whether advances in modern technologies make the realization of these aims 
more efficient. If so, not only can the prevalence of state violence and digital 
authoritarianism be determined, but their interworking role in enabling regime 
stabilization may be discovered as well. 
 
28 Minna Heikura, “Journalism in Kashmir: State of repression,” International Press Institute, March 17, 
2020. 
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 Admittedly, the classification of these goals strictly within the confines of 
“autocracy” and “authoritarianism” is somewhat problematic. Much of this relates to the 
argument made by Gunitsky as it pertains to the term “digital authoritarianism.” Simply 
put, associating the use of internet technologies to achieve the above five aims would 
improperly exclude many within democratic societies who do the very same. 
In the United States, for example, a June 2020 leak revealed that local and federal 
law enforcement agencies were tracking protestors during the summer’s Black Lives 
Matter demonstrations: surveilling personal communications as well as monitoring public 
forums like Facebook event RSVPs to log future protests and specific individuals.29 This 
falls neatly within the constraints of the aforementioned “surveillance of dissidents” 
category. Furthermore, President Donald Trump spent much of the leadup and wake of 
the 2020 election spreading misinformation about clear and established electoral 
processes; Trump employed this strategy so much so that the platform actually began to 
label his tweets as “disputed” or “misleading”—eventually permanently suspending his 
account after his rhetoric helped incite the January 2021 Capitol attack. By utilizing 
Twitter as a means to systematically disseminate falsehoods about mail-in voting, vote 
tabulation, and election results, the President sought to legitimize an ongoing incumbency 
at a point he perceived himself to be losing control. While this still may have been 
possible without the use of internet technologies, the capability to instantaneously reach 
hundreds of millions of Twitter users substantially increased his ability to achieve the 
second and third categories of the goals list. 
 
29 Mara Hvistendahl; Alleen Brown, “Law Enforcement Scoured Protester Communications and 
Exaggerated Threats to Minneapolis Cops, Leaked Documents Show,” The Intercept, June 26, 2020. 
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In spite of this, these goals are still worthy of consideration under the umbrella of 
authoritarianism. While Gunitsky makes the strong assertion that terms like “digital 
authoritarianism” can cause observers to overlook such instances within nonauthoritarian 
states, his take does not detract from the reality that these cases are in fact incompatible 
with the core tenets of liberalism regardless of whether they occur within a democratic 
setting. In short, shying away from appropriately descriptive nomenclature could have the 
unintended consequence of lessening the perceived nature of the threat these tactics pose.  
As a final point prior to the examination of the relevant literature, clarification 
regarding the usage of several key terms should be established outright. Though 
“repression” and “violence” may seemingly be used interchangeably throughout this 
piece, an important distinction should be drawn between the two. While violence can 
absolutely be a manifestation of repression, repression can also include non-bloody 
coercive acts such as “arrests, imprisonment…denial of due processes and 
disappearances.”30 Simply put, all state violence is repressive, but not all repression is 
explicitly violent. Recognizing this difference is crucial in determining the precise nature 
of authoritarian action by the state. 
Empirically, the theory of informational autocracy laid out by Guriev and 
Treisman is strongly convincing. In their 2017 dataset on authoritarian control 
techniques, the two were able to measure the average amount of state killings conducted 
by autocrats ruling for at least five years in the period from 1945 to 2015. As finding 
accurate statistics for topics like such human rights abuses is commonly difficult due to 
widespread disputes and cover-ups, the dataset draws from over 950 sources across a 
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broad breadth of origins. Two main trends emerge: first, while the number of dictators 
who were responsible for at least ten killings per year rose by over twenty percent from 
the 1940s to the 1980s, this category of leader dropped sharply from that point forward—
down over thirty percent into the 2010s.31 Secondly, outside of a brief reversion of the 
1940s mean during the 1960s, the amount of dictators responsible for at least one 
hundred killings has decreased consistently over the past seventy years.32  
 The evidence for this decrease in killings becomes even stronger when accounting 
for a variety of related factors and patterns. Though political killings have been shown to 
increase during times of civil war and major insurgency, eliminating leaders who ruled 
under such circumstances from the dataset actually sharpens the decrease.33 Furthermore, 
instances of mass killings—defined by the deaths of at least one thousand 
noncombatants—fell twenty-one percent from 1992 to 2013.34  
 Certainly, political killings are far from the only method of repression—or even 
violent repression—that regimes have at their disposal. However, the data that Guriev 
and Treisman have collected suggests that these other tactics are also in meaningful 
decline. To start, use of torture from regimes has decreased from 96 percent to 74 percent 
over the course of the last thirty years—a point the two cite as especially surprising due 
to the fact that modern human rights monitoring should unveil instances of such abuse far 
more effectively than could be done in the past.35  
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 As it relates to nonviolent yet still unmistakably repressive actions, Guriev and 
Treisman plot political imprisonment much in the same way that they measure state 
killings. The drops are even more remarkable: the number of autocrats who detained 
more than one hundred political prisoners in a given year plummeted forty-four percent 
from the 1970s to the present, and those who detained more than one thousand plunged 
forty-three percent.36 Overall, when viewed holistically, it seems that both violent and 
nonviolent means of repression have fallen significantly and consistently into the twenty-
first century.  
 While this does not necessarily mean that repression cannot be a successful tool in 
the arsenal of an authoritarian regime, it would be shortsighted to act as if this decline has 
happened for no reason. One theory Guriev and Treisman posit is that this decrease may 
stem from the decline of appeal for communist, authoritarian ideologies since the end of 
the Cold War—a fairly strong potential explanation considering political killings and 
imprisonments dropped most drastically in the waning and succeeding years of the 
conflict.37 As it relates to the larger question of internet technology’s role in this decline, 
this makes it reasonable to surmise it is in fact larger democratization trends—not 
technological developments—that have been more responsible for such regime changes. 
Recent research also strongly suggests that, in one way or another, autocrats 
around the world have shifted to understand that there are more effective means of 
maintaining power and controlling a populace than brute force. For many, these lessons 
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were reinforced during the initial stages of the Arab Spring at the beginning of the 
2010s—perhaps in no case as greatly as Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak.38 
 At a point where other contemporary autocrats at the international level had 
clearly begun to shift their tactics—as evidenced by Guriev and Treisman—Mubarak 
comfortably doubled down on the traditional means of control. For instance, in his 
penultimate year of rule, when the number of dictators who had imprisoned more than 
one thousand political prisoners was only at sixteen percent of authoritarian rulers over 
the course of the decade worldwide, Human Rights Watch reported that between five to 
ten thousand were detained in Egypt.39 Under his reign, torture by the security apparatus 
was a regular occurrence, and freedom of assembly and expression were nonexistent. 
While Mubarak had fostered discontent for decades, the newly developing political and 
technological environment he faced in 2011 created the perfect conditions for political 
upheaval. His lack of responsiveness to these changing factors allows for a case study 
which illustrates the limitations of repression in the modern age plainly. 
 Against the backdrop of the uprising in Tunisia that had successfully displaced 
Ben Ali from power, hundreds of thousands of Egyptians would take to the streets to 
protest the state of their own regime in January. However, it was not Tunisia nor 
spontaneity that were the sole drivers of such collective action: international NGOs had 
been strengthening the capabilities of domestic opposition groups significantly since the 
1990s through the documentation of human rights abuses, networking with local groups, 
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and mobilization of public opinion within Egypt. While it would be inappropriate to 
assign all credit for the 2011 protests to these international organizations—it was the 
Egyptian people who ultimately rose up—it would be equally problematic to deny the 
impact that these groups had on the process.  
Such actions are entirely consistent with the concept of the boomerang effect as 
they demonstrate a clear example of a people subverting their nonresponsive government 
by working with international allies. Selim summarizes the effects on the movement—
and Mubarak’s options—succinctly: 
…These organizations played an important role in mobilizing Egyptian 
public opinion against the oppressive nature of the Mubarak regime. As 
the content of [their] reports became widely covered by local and 
international media, opposition newspapers and social media forums, 
opposition and civil society groups were able to attract larger domestic 
audiences from diverse political and socioeconomic backgrounds in 
support of their battle against the regime. This, in turn, put the Mubarak 
regime under increasing pressure as it found it more difficult to proceed 
with its oppressive measures without being detected and exposed, thereby 
undermining its legitimacy.40  
 
This erosion of legitimacy that Selim describes is the exact development that Guriev and 
Treisman cite as the principle threat a regime faces in the preservation of its power.  
Despite the dangers of doing so, though, Mubarak would again resort to the same, 
overt repressive tactics that had put him in such a position in the first place: digital 
authoritarianism would manifest in the form of internet blackouts, and use of force 
against protestors would result in nearly seven thousand casualties over the course of 
eighteen days—including eight hundred and forty-six deaths.41 By the time Mubarak did 
seek to reconcile with the population through constitutional and legislative reforms, he 
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had lost the will of not just his people, but also the security forces which had legitimized 
his power in the first place. Bellin’s research identifies the coercive apparatus as a pivotal 
force in the determination of regime durability, and Mubarak’s strategy of utilizing 
repression without considering the position and motivations of his own was ultimately 
central to his demise.42  
 Much scholarly insight has been gained by examining these themes of repression 
and regime legitimacy through the lens of Mubarak’s Egypt. Echoing the points above, 
Hussein argues that the regime’s use of repression—in tandem with its poor political and 
economic performance—was counterproductive in quelling dissent, and ultimately served 
to delegitimize its reign rather than secure its longevity.43 He compounds these findings 
by adding that the expansion of previously unavailable internet technologies were 
integral in exposing this lack of legitimacy, and created a window of opportunity for 
regime change that could not have existed before. Danju et al. are among many who 
mirror this latter idea, contending that social media was “catalytic” in sparking Arab 
Spring revolts like Egypt’s.44 That said, a glaring question remains from such literature: 
does this mean there is a direct correlation between internet diffusion and decreases in 
state violence, or do these “catalytic” effects only occur when the regime has been 
delegitimized to the point of no return? 
 Certainly, some leaders have continued to maintain their traditional modes of 
repression as a means to quell dissent a decade after the Arab Spring. However, research 
 
42 Eva Bellin, “Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the 
Arab Spring,” Comparative Politics 44, no. 2 (January 2012), 143. 
43 Ebtisam Hussein, “Rationalizing Public Repression: Mubarak’s Self-Toppling Regime,” Middle East 
Policy Council XXV, no. 1, (Spring 2018). 
44 Ipek Danju, Yasar Maasoglu, Nahide Maasoglu, “From Autocracy to Democracy: The Impact of Social 
Media on the Transformation Process in North Africa and Middle East,” Procedia – Social and Behavioral 
Sciences 81, (2013), 678. 
 25 
is increasingly backing the viewpoint drawn from Mubarak’s case that repression is 
ineffective in this overall mission. Pan and Siegel, for example, compiled tweets and 
Google search results originating from Saudi Arabia between 2010 and 2017 in an effort 
to measure whether the volume of public discourse and level of government criticism was 
reduced repressive government action. They came to two main conclusions: physical 
repression does have a direct deterrent effect on targeted dissenters, nevertheless, news of 
such actions not only fails to suppress movements, but actually generates increased 
public attention and engagement with existing opposition coalitions.45 King, Pan, and 
Roberts cite this very reality as the basis for the Chinese Communist Party’s own 
domestic strategy, and even the impetus for their avoidance of hard censorship beyond 
evidence of collective action.46 Surely, the Saudi’s failure as one of the world’s harshest 
autocratic regimes to stop the growth of outcry both internationally and within its own 
borders is proof that the traditional authoritarian playbook is outdated—at least when 
relied on nearly exclusively.  
 Global statistics suggest that this message does seem to have resonated with many 
of the world’s autocrats. Beyond China, Chenoweth and Perkoski found that nonviolent 
protest movements are about three times less likely to be met with the most overt method 
of repression—mass killings—than their violent counterparts.47 Some have sought to 
expand on this idea that nonviolent protest is less likely to draw violent repression; 
Larsson, for instance, presents evidence that higher levels of gender equality also account 
 
45 Jennifer Pan; Alexandra Siegel, “How Saudi Crackdowns Fail to Silence Online Dissent,” American 
Political Science Review 114, no. 1 (2020), 123. 
46 Gary King; Jennifer Pan; Margaret Roberts, “How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism 
but Silences Collective Expression,” American Political Science Review 107, no. 2 (May 2013), 326. 
47 Erika Chenoweth, Evan Perkoski,“Nonviolent resistance and prevention of mass killings during popular 
uprisings,” International Center on Nonviolent Conflict Special Report Series no. 2, (May 2018), 23. 
 26 
for a significant decrease in extreme repression.48 Overall, though, this relationship 
between nonviolence and use of repression is consistent with trends of decreased state 
violence that Guriev and Treisman have pointed to over the past half century. That said, 
Chenoweth and Perkoski also state unequivocally that repression itself has not been 
abandoned entirely, and in its lesser forms can still be common against peaceful 
demonstrations.49  
 Furthermore, cases studies like Saudi Arabia implicitly raise one equally 
important point: use of such playbooks is not always driving regime change either. 
Without a doubt, in the post-Cold War years it is not autocracy on the backtrack at the 
global stage—it is democracy. 2020 marked the fourteenth consecutive year of decline in 
worldwide freedom according to Freedom House, and while 64 countries were part of 
this negative trend, only 37 saw marked improvements. This was all despite a boom in 
new protest movements around the world.50 Repression may be ineffective at stabilizing 
regimes on its own, but when combined with more modern practices the pairing is clearly 
not failing either.  
In the previous chapter, it was illustrated that autocrats have a myriad of such 
individual techniques available to seek self-preservation through weaponizing internet 
technologies. In general, these tactics can largely be broken into the four main strategic 
categories of filtering, blocking, co-opting, and flooding. As these technologies have 
rapidly developed over the course of the 2010s, one clear focus that has emerged within 
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the literature of authoritarianism has been the study of the specific goals these techniques 
set out to achieve. Effectively, these findings can be broken down into five primary 
themes: surveillance of dissidents, dissemination of misinformation, regime 
legitimization, creation of fear, and elimination of dissenters’ operational capacity. 
Surveillance of dissidents 
Prior to the time where populations could be connected by the internet, much of 
the most valuable information a regime could seek was largely buried from view. At the 
most fundamental level, democratization stems from discontent, and without adequate 
knowledge of what specific grievances spur discontent in a respective country a regime is 
simply unable to respond—whether through actual, perceived, or further repressive 
changes. Therefore, the existence of social media as a public forum for all thoughts 
positive and negative results in an informational goldmine for autocrats seeking to 
address problems before they grow too large. In a larger qualitative discussion about how 
social media can act as a tool of autocratic stability, Gunitsky states that tapping into the 
raw, unfiltered dialogue of the overall populace acts as a “continuous feedback loop 
between the rulers and the ruled,” and both policy and regime response can easily be 
altered as deemed necessary.51 The potential of these spaces for authoritarians grows 
even further when considering that surveillance of such spheres is essentially costless due 
to their open, public nature.52 
Social media is far from the only way that a regime can reveal the preferences of 
the masses. For generations, elections have been utilized to measure public attitudes by 
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showing what percentage of the country backs the opposition over the existing power, 
and autocrats can simply misrepresent the true results while reaping the benefits of the 
gathered information.53 Still, the benefits of a constantly updating digital public forum 
versus elections are obvious. For starters, elections in authoritarian states may only occur 
once every several years. This severely hampers the frequency in which an autocrat can 
track public opinion, which directly correlates to the relevance and accuracy of derived 
results. Furthermore, while scholarly debate is contentious, some have even argued that 
elections may actually help facilitate democratization in authoritarian states—a 
development completely opposite of the objective to stabilize autocratic rule.54 Research 
such as these act as striking examples of the power of these social media technologies. 
Dissemination of misinformation 
The proliferation of misinformation in the modern age is staggering, and even in 
the most anecdotal sense it is nearly impossible to spend any significant time on the 
internet without encountering falsehoods or propaganda. Part of the reasons for this is 
simply the nature of the internet: in order for a message to spread—true or false—it does 
not necessarily require the effort of the originator beyond its initial posting. Indeed, once 
a Tweet, website, or post is sent, it is their shareability by and to the masses that allows 
for the spread across states, territories, and oceans. Recent research has further supported 
this theory: technologies like bots spread true and false information at the identical rate, 
strongly implying that humans bear primary responsibility for the spread of 
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misinformation.55 The disparity between misinformation and truth spread cannot be 
clearer: false news stories are seventy percent more likely to be shared than their true 
counterparts, and spread approximately six times more quickly.56 
These digital realities play straight to the advantage of authoritarian regimes, and 
create an environment primed for the dissemination of disinformation that benefits the 
long-term stability of the existing power. One method that regimes have traditionally 
used to propagate their own narratives is the broadcasting of such messages through 
state-run or controlled media. This distinction is important: as just one example, in the 
realm of television it is common practice for an authoritarian state to own its own 
station(s), which in tandem with restrictions on outside programming effectively 
monopolizes the airwaves. Still, this monopolization is not necessarily predicated on state 
ownership of television networks: Hem contends that the weaponization of media 
licensing has emerged as an increasingly attractive alternative for the state. In his 
research, he investigates the case studies of Singapore, Malaysia, Venezuela, and Russia, 
and finds that if publishers stray too far from the state’s line—which itself is uncommon 
due to the fact the interests of the two are often firmly aligned—they can be replaced 
quickly and efficiently.57 This effectively results in self-censorship that makes direct 
regime action unnecessary.58 Overall, in both scenarios of state control, the information 
being broadcasted is effectively beholden to the regime rather than the truth.  
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The natural extension in the digital age has been the presence of state-controlled 
media on the internet. Examples such as China’s “Great Firewall” demonstrate how 
easily a robust mix of digital authoritarianism tools allows a regime to control the flow of 
information within its own borders, but what may be perhaps less obvious is the power 
that state-controlled media can have internationally as well. When exposed to the state-
owned propaganda outlet Russia Today (RT), Americans are up to twenty percent more 
likely to “support withdrawing from America’s role as a cooperative global leader”—a 
repeated, stated foreign policy desire of the Russian government.59 Even more strikingly, 
these figures were consistent across party lines, and did not change upon disclosure of 
RT’s financial backing.60 Misinformation does not always come in the form of blatant 
lies: often it manifests as an incomplete or intentionally misleading depiction of a larger 
picture. In this more encompassing light, the effectiveness of pro-regime misinformation 
campaigns becomes clearer, graver, and greater with the aid of modern internet 
technologies. 
Regime legitimization 
This goal is largely intertwined with the prior: if regimes use internet technologies 
with the goal of spreading misinformation, such communications are typically part of the 
larger mission to legitimize the existing power. However, the use of misinformation is 
certainly not the only way a state can accomplish this—hence the value of distinguishing 
between the two.  
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Like before, regime legitimization was a practice that existed long before the 
advent of the digital age. Similar to the discussion regarding surveillance of dissidents, 
elections have often been at the forefront of attaining this goal: if a regime can maintain 
the appearance that its elections are fair, it gives credence to the levers and institutions 
that put a power in place. In turn, if the autocrat in power is perceived to have been 
elected freely and fairly, it legitimizes their rule as a leader popular enough to gain the 
state’s highest office. Of course, the challenge for the regime is to successfully portray a 
fraudulent election as genuine, and the causes and effects of each outcome are covered 
extensively throughout the literature. However, for the purpose of this work, such basic 
aforementioned knowledge of the strategy is perfectly adequate.   
In discussing the potential of social media to bolster regime legitimacy, Gunitsky 
expands past the strategy of misinformation dissemination by addressing the technology’s 
capability to countermobilize state allies in the face of opposition movements. It is 
impossible for a regime to exist without at least some popular support, and this is often 
most heavily concentrated within the business sector, military, and ideologically aligned 
citizens.61 Even if the true base of support is dwarfed in reality by the forces of dissent, 
social networks allow the regime to connect, recruit, and rally supporters in a way not 
unlike the processes protestors themselves employ.62 When aided by the other tactics of 
digital authoritarianism, this disparity in size can quickly disappear as pro-government 
voices are elevated and eventually dominate the airspace. Gunitsky points to Russia and 
China as two particular states where significant domestic regime appeal stems from 
organic, ideological roots (in other words, propaganda was unnecessary to gain these 
 
61 Gunitsky, Corrupting the Cyber Commons, 45. 
62 Ibid. 
 32 
supporters), and highlights MacKinnon’s concept of “digital Bonapartism” as the means 
in which this initial base can help drown out voices of opposition.63 
Create fear 
As networks such as Facebook and Twitter continue their exponential growth into 
the new decade, their potential to be used as a means to spread fear is becoming 
increasingly apparent. Furthermore, examples such as Myanmar prove that the regime 
does not even have to act as the primary promoter for such developments—it can often 
just act as the enabler.  
In the current scholarship, two key implications of globalism in Myanmar are 
being raised. Firstly, due to low costs and high demand for connectedness, there has been 
an explosion of cheap cellphones in the hands of citizens previously barred from even 
accessing such means of digital communications in the first place. 64 Secondly, due to its 
preinstallation on most devices and exemption to data quotas on many plans, Facebook 
has rapidly dominated the populace.65 In short, Facebook has effectively become the 
internet in Myanmar, so nationalist, anti-Muslim propaganda that seeks to exploit the 
nature of social media has the ability to reach even greater proportions of the population 
than it could in other countries.66 By using the platform to spread dangerous speech and 
organize against the Muslim minority, the movement has started a genocide which has 
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wiped out villages, killed thousands, and forced over one million to flee abroad—Asia’s 
largest human exodus since the Vietnam War.67 
These human rights atrocities may not be the main doing of the Myanmar 
government, but their failure to condemn and forcefully end the crisis has been damning. 
This may stem from the fact that the rhetoric used by the nationalist movement is not 
dissimilar from past propaganda by the military government aimed at creating “unity.’68 
Regardless, the primary lesson to be drawn from Myanmar is not only the degree to 
which internet technologies can stoke fear—both for “insiders” of “outsiders” and 
“outsiders” of “insiders”—but how easily it can be created by nongovernment forces. 
While the military arm of the government certainly has accumulated more direct blood on 
its hands than the civilian government, it is the civilian government’s inaction that has 
been the root of international outcry. It is deeply disturbing to imagine the degree to 
which this fear—as well as its effects—could be amplified if the government chose to 
actively aid the process with its own means of digital authoritarianism.  
For the purposes of regime survival, a widespread domestic fear of outsiders can 
work to divert attention away from the existing power. When attention is focused on the 
regime itself, however, the value of fear for a regime should not be dismissed either. In 
fairness, the ineffectiveness of repression as a blanket strategy to quell dissent has been 
examined multiple times thus far—particularly by Chenoweth and Perkoski—so it can be 
reasonably argued that reliance on fear from this source is not in the best interest of an 
autocrat attempting to maintain power. On one hand, Aldama et al. do create a formalized 
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model for how an increase in civilian risk aversion can increase the probability of large-
scale mobilization.69  However, their models also show that fear can be successful at 
increasing dissidents’ pessimism for the movement’s potential success in the face of 
perceived regime strength, as well as pessimism for the likelihood of attaining necessary 
levels of participation from other dissenters—a formula that in some cases can indeed 
hamper opposition mobilization.70 With this knowledge in mind, authoritarians may have 
a real incentive to instill fear not just of outsiders, but of their own rule as well. While 
traditional means of repression certainly can achieve this, the aforementioned examples 
of this work clearly show the capability of internet technologies to support this goal as 
well. 
Elimination of dissenters’ operational capacity 
At an abstract level, the elimination of the opposition’s ability to continue 
operating is the end goal of any authoritarian action. In short, if a movement no longer 
has the means to operate—whether that be through loss of popular support, fear of 
repercussions, or other negative outcomes—the threat of regime change to the existing 
power drops to a substantially low level. That said, digital authoritarianism also provides 
the means for the immediate, literal severing of much of a movement’s operations—
namely, through internet blackouts. 
Mubarak again retains relevance here—though he is certainly far from the only 
example. By shutting down the internet, Egypt’s dictator sought to isolate dissenters from 
each other, discourage further mobilization through both fear and impracticability of 
 
69 Abraham Aldama; Mateo Vásquez-Cortés; Lauren Elyssa Young, “Fear and citizen coordination against 
dictatorship,” Journal of Theoretical Politics 31, no. 1, (2019), 103. 
70 Ibid. 
 35 
distanced organizing, and ultimately end the protests that had begun to take to the streets. 
Of course, this vision was not what transpired. Hassanpour notes that the communications 
blackout caused those who were previously absent from the demonstrations to actually 
join the crowds in an effort to reconnect with family, friends, and other contacts.71 
Apolitical and uninterested citizens were also implicated.72 Furthermore, ground level 
activists were not only emboldened, but actually became more effective due to their 
ability to contact individuals directly.73 The final counterproductive result, according to 
Hassanpour, was the fact that the movement become much more decentralized without a 
core communications space (i.e. Facebook or Twitter), which in turn exponentially 
increased the difficulty of suppression by the Egyptian government74.  
However, in approaching the question of operational capacity it is not the results 
of Mubarak’s actions that is of chief importance: it is the motivation. For him, it was a 
final, desperate resort to reclaim control over the situation upon the realization that the 
power and speed of internet technologies was as extraordinary as the degree to which he 
was unprepared to confront it.75 In the post-Mubarak world, the cost remains 
exceptionally high—both politically and economically—for a full internet blackout, 
which seemingly suggests that autocrats will only resort to the measure for the most 
existential of threats.76 While this may be true for some leaders, it fails to account for the 
significant and constant rise of blackouts around the world—particularly in India and its 
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contested territories. If blackouts are truly so likely to end catastrophically for a regime, 
why would their use continue to rise globally? Perhaps a key gap in the literature is the 
absence of a conclusive answer to whether states have realized the limits of the technique 
as a singular means of ending widespread, ongoing dissent, while concurrently 
discovering the effectiveness of severing operational capacity before such movements 
can ever reach critical mass.  
As a point of emphasis, these five goals that have been outlined are both fluid and 
interconnected in their nature. To recall the comparison between misinformation 
dissemination and regime legitimization, the purpose of one goal may ultimately be to 
realize the fuller attainment of another. Furthermore, this list of goals could assuredly be 
broken down into numerous more subcategories and priorities, for a complete evaluation 
of an authoritarian power’s objectives could encompass a thesis in of itself. However, 
even an initial identification of these goals helps more effectively elucidate the current 
situation in Kashmir.  
Since its first iteration in 2015, Guriev and Treisman’s theory of informational 
autocracy has been repeatedly cited in the larger scholarship of authoritarian governance. 
Typically, the piece has been referenced in three main contexts. Firstly, it is used to 
establish the counterproductivity of repression in securing public support.77 Secondly, it 
is invoked to demonstrate that the manipulation of information has become a favored 
technique amongst the world’s autocrats.78 Thirdly, it is referred to when identifying the 
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importance of managing a regime’s “informed elites,” and the threat that they can pose to 
the existing power’s overall longevity.79  
 To this point, however, there has yet to be a truly comprehensive analysis of the 
relationship between repression and informational autocracy as it relates to the transition 
between the two strategies. One can reasonably surmise that this, at least in part, may be 
due to the relevant recency of Guriev and Treisman’s work. As of 2020, the piece has 
been expanded and revised several times—including twice in the past year alone. 
Moreover, in fairness to Guriev and Treisman, a deeper study of the intersection between 
these two competing strategies was not the intention of their work at all: the specific 
purpose of the theory was to illustrate that a shift away from traditional means of 
repression has occurred in autocratic regimes, and it accomplishes this quite 
compellingly.  
The research on authoritarianism does not assert that the availability of the tools 
of informational autocracy results in blanket abandonment of violence to facilitate regime 
preservation—Chenoweth and Perkoski are just two scholars who affirm the prevalence 
of such methods. Moreover, Guriev and Treisman themselves explicitly acknowledge this 
as they introduce their theory:  
…Today’s softer dictatorships do not forswear repression completely. 
Informational autocrats may use considerable violence in fighting ethnic 
insurgencies and civil wars—as, in fact, do some democracies. They may 
also punish journalists as a mode of censorship (although they seek to 
camouflage the purpose or to conceal the state’s role in violent acts). Such 
states can revert to overt dictatorship, as may have happened after the 
2016 coup attempt in Turkey, where the regime of Recep Tayyip Erdogan 
detained tens of thousands.80 
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Especially deserving of attention is their note on democracies. At a population well over 
one billion, India will comfortably maintain the title of “the world’s largest democracy” 
for many years to come. At the same time, the country’s actions in the areas it feels least 
control over—namely, the Kashmir Valley and the Indian northeast—frequently veer 
away from the fundamental principles of liberalized democracy.  
 This final point has particular relevance for research that has suggested a positive 
correlation between the existence of internet technologies and increased democratization 
within a nondemocratic landscape. Bak et al., for example, propose that “high internet 
penetration rates have deterring effects on state repression,” and that “extending internet 
access to citizens will yield protective effects.”81 Though they stipulate these effects are 
strongest in competitive democracies, their sentiment that these technologies are 
inherently liberalizing has been shared by many—including Zang et. al. who argue that 
“Internet penetration can remarkably increase democratization over a period of time in a 
country.”82 Even if Kashmir was unique in its failure to democratize and see reductions in 
repression through the diffusion of the internet—it is not83—the existence of its reality 
alone necessitates thorough examination. For this repressive informational autocracy to 
come from a democracy like India accentuates the need even more. 
 For both the free and unfree world, it is imperative that a greater understanding of 
the intersection between informational autocracy and traditional state repression is 
examined. It is not enough to simply identify an inverse proportionality between the two, 
 
81 Daehee Bak; Surachanee Sriyai; Stephen A. Meserve, “The internet and state repression: A cross-
national analysis of the limits of digital constraint,” Journal of Human Rights 17, no. 5, (2018), 1475 
82 Leizhen Zang; Feng Xiong; Yanjan Gao, “Reversing the U: New Evidence on the Internet and 
Democracy Relationship,” Social Science Computer Review 37, no. 3 (2018), 15. 
83 Jacob Groshek, Kate K. Mays, “A Time-Series, Multinational Analysis of Democratic Forecasts and 
Emerging Media Diffusion, 1994-2014,” International Journal of Communication 11, (2017), 429. 
 39 
as while this trend may be present at the global scale it may also be wholly 
unrepresentative of the true situation at a domestic level in specific cases. The potential 
of informational autocracy to abet violence rather than replace it has grave implications 
for the pursuit of a just global society, and even graver ones for the citizens who must 









































Now and again there comes a moment in the affairs of men when courage is 
greater than prudence and a great act of faith uplifting the minds and moving the 




Early Development of Kashmir 
 
 The vast, mountainous swath of land that makes up the modern-day region of 
“Kashmir” has changed hands many times over the course of its civilized history. For 
sure, the Kashmiris are no strangers to occupation from great, foreign powers, dating 
back to the Mughal conquest, years of British colonialism, and through today’s current 
division as it stands between India, Pakistan, and China. Alongside this history, the 
people have also spent periods of time enjoying the fruits of their own sovereignty. 
Regardless, the larger point to be made is that the Kashmiris are a proud, distinct people 
that have closely held onto their own identity from ancient times to the present, and that 
any analysis of the current conflict that ignores this reality in favor of the external 
belligerents risks painting an incomplete—or even inaccurate—picture of the real 
situation.    
 Today, the term “Kashmir” has become associated with the roughly 85,800 square 
miles of mountains, valleys, plains, and forests that are bordered by India proper to the 
south, Pakistan proper to the east, Afghanistan to the northwest, and the Chinese-
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controlled autonomous regions of Xinjiang and Tibet to its north and northeast.85 As a 
significant portion of the territory lies within the Himalayan region, the towering 
mountains which are the predominant, defining feature of Kashmir’s geography split the 
land into the valleys where its people have generally resided. This harsh landscape is 
largely responsible for the degree to which the many different peoples of the broader 
region—including Buddhists, Hindus, Muslims, and Tibetans—were able to be separated 
throughout history. As late as the mid-twentieth century, Birdwood described the region 
as “a mountainous country of no roads, whose isolated groups are conscious only of their 
own existence,” and argued that this fact accounted for much of the reason its people 
were susceptible to invasion and occupation throughout the centuries.86  
 Kashmir’s first experience with imperialism can be traced back to the third 
century BC, when Ashoka the Great’s Maurya Dynasty would go on to stretch across the 
near entirety of the Indian subcontinent. After Ashoka’s death and an ensuing period of 
reestablished sovereignty, Kushan invaders from northwest China would arrive in the 
first century AD and bring with them the Buddhist tradition that Ashoka had originally 
spread throughout Kashmir after his conversion from Hinduism. This time would later 
take on the legacy as Kashmir’s “golden age,” as its people enjoyed cultural and 
economic fame that stretched far throughout Asia.87   
 Like much of the rest of the continent, Kashmir and India proper would go on to 
succumb to the seemingly unstoppable tide of Genghis Kahn’s Mongol Empire—first 
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coming under attack in 1320. Though the Mongol occupation was relatively brief, its 
importance to Kashmir’s development cannot be understated. To start, the human and 
material costs suffered by the Kashmiris—who had already been weakened by 
progressively diminishing resources due to isolationism—were extraordinarily damaging 
and would be felt long into the future.88 On a more positive note, the Mongol invasion did 
bring forth both the Cultural Revolution and further fame and appreciation for the area’s 
picturesque landscape. However, the most impactful consequence by far was the fact that 
this event would be seen as the final act of dominant Buddhist and Hindu rule in the 
region; indeed, such traditions were soon eschewed by the ideology that had been 
knocking on Kashmir’s doorstep for quite some time, which has since gone on to find 
itself at the center of the modern IndoPak identity crisis: Islam.89 
 Though the first formal instance of Muslim rule would occur in 1339, Kashmir’s 
first great Islamic king, Shahab-ud Din, would ascend the throne in 1354.90 It was during 
his reign that Kashmir would begin to expand into many of the territories the region is 
associated with today, and under subsequent rulers the region began to increasingly 
convert to Islam—though Hinduism certainly did not fade away entirely. Habibullah 
makes this pointed commentary of the effect of this period of time:  
“the history of Islam is inextricable from the history of Kashmir. The faith 
developed a distinct identity: the Hindi Muslim world was deeply 
influenced by the ancient heritage of Hinduism. India saw a surge in the 
spiritual form of Islam in the various schools of Sufi thought, which 
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preceded Turkish invasions from the northwest and went on to become the 
foundation of the vibrant form that Islam took in India.”91   
 
Of particular note here should be the means by which Islam spread throughout Kashmir: 
not through an autocratic culture war where traditional religious philosophies were 
squashed, but instead through an inclusive blend that respected the fundamentals of 
practices that existed before.  
By fully appreciating this fact, one can start better contextualize the current 
situation on the subcontinent. Too often, the Kashmir question has been mischaracterized 
as a conflict between the forces of Islam, secularism, and Hindu nationalism in which the 
people and traditions are incompatible, and where victory must be a zero-sum game. 
However, as the region’s rich history of multiculturalism demonstrates, this could not be 
further from the case. For sure, this is not to say that religious tensions play no role: this 
fact becomes increasingly clear in the mid-twentieth century. That said, the more 
consistent pattern throughout history has been the prevalence of external rule over the 
Kashmiris—and the population’s clear discontent.   
It would be over two hundred years later that this ‘middle age’ of Kashmiri 
history—and larger era of Kashmir as its own kingdom—would eventually transition into 
‘modern history,’ brought forth by the Mughal conquest of 1586. Though this specific 
rule did bring aspects of liberalism, prosperity, and stability which have generally been 
seen as positive, it also marked a distinct embrace of the pattern of external 
administration and taxes that has lasted through the current moment.92 By the turn of the 
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19th century, Hindus had begun leaving Kashmir en masse for a variety of reasons 
ranging from persecution to greater economic potential elsewhere, and this exodus would 
only be exacerbated in ensuing Afghan and Sikh tenures of rule. However, this time 
under the shadow of the Sikh Empire would be extremely short lived, as by this point 
both the power and influence of the East India Company were enough to now tip the 
balance of power in Kashmir. 
The amount of scholarship dedicated to the East India Company, the British Raj, 
and overall Crown Rule is both extensive and deeply complex. It is impossible to ignore 
the impact that the British have had on the subcontinent, as the implications of their time 
and actions leading up to the Partition of India are central to how the situation has 
unfolded today. Yet, for the purpose of this thesis, Lamb provides an adequate synthesis 
of Britain’s motivations moving into the twentieth century: 
The British had originally established themselves along the Indian shores 
for purposes of trade. In order to protect that trade they had built up an 
Empire. Once created, however, the Empire became an objective in its 
own right and British policy became increasingly directed towards 
keeping the Empire in being. Some thinkers like Seeley might ask 
themselves what it was all for; but most English statesmen ceased to 
question the value of the brightest jewel in the British Crown. Like the 
other Crown Jewels, it should be guarded. It was in this frame of mind that 
the British faced the problem of Indian self-government.93 
 
This is a view supported by Schofield, who argues that “British imperial policy towards 
the state of Jammu and Kashmir in the late 19th century was guided primarily by fear of a 
Russian advance towards India through the Pamir mountains,” in addition to threats from 
Afghanistan and China.94 In short, Kashmir represented not only a part of the Empire the 
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British were prideful of, but in the bigger picture served as both the gateway and 
geostrategic buffer zone for the rest of the subcontinent. Even at that point in history, the 
rugged terrain of Kashmir was of crucial strategic importance.  
By the start of the 1900s, Britain had been in control of Kashmir for a little over a 
half century following the Sikh’s ceding of the territory per the conditions of the Treaty 
of Peace—and sale of the region to the subordinate Dogras in the Treaty of Amritsar. At 
this point, there was a very real level of animosity towards the ruling class by the 
Kashmiris that had dated back through hundreds of years of external occupation. Much of 
this stemmed from just how reliant they had become on these forces: even as far into the 
late 1940s, there were only sixteen miles of railroad connecting Kashmir to the outside, 
and only a single all-weather road which lead directly to the Punjab capital of Lahore—a 
city which not only had a “stranglehold on Kashmir’s business,” but had also historically 
been the heart of Punjabi oppression over them.95  
Schofield describes the state of 1930s Kashmir as “a proverbial powder keg.”96 
Muslims were barred from owning firearms and joining the military, and had even been 
stripped of their right to own land; in no uncertain terms, the socioeconomic state of 
Kashmiri Muslims was nothing short of destitute. Under the rule of Maharaja Hari Singh, 
both Muslims and Hindus protested against his autocratic rule. However, tensions 
between the two groups were unmistakable: in 1931, Hindu shops were the victims of 
protests, riots, and looting stemming from a call “to fight against oppression,” and even 
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the reform measures brought on by the government to meet the cries for change 
amounted to little than more symbolic measures.97 
It is in this context that Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah would go on to found the 
Muslim Conference in 1931 with the clear purpose of aligning opposition against the 
autocracy of the maharaja, and ultimately, securing autonomy for Kashmir. In the next 
decade, however, this movement would split into two main factions: the National 
Conference and the Muslim Conference. While the two groups certainly had many 
differences, the two largest were where each drew their support from. The former, the 
National Conference, enjoyed backing from Muslims within the Kashmir Valley, while 
the latter organization’s support came from Muslims outside of the valley. In addition, 
the Muslim Conference was tied to the Muslim League—who advocated for the creation 
of a separate Muslim state. Meanwhile, the Congress Party—a nationalist movement 
dating back to the late 19th century—stood firmly in support of independence for each of 
the Indian states. 
By the 1940s, it was clear that a partition was on the horizon for the subcontinent. 
While the Second World War largely drew Britain’s attention away from Calcutta and 
Kashmir and instead to Berlin, Rome, and Tokyo, it was now impossible to look away 
from the forces of Muslim discontent, Hindu nationalism, and the general fervor for 
Indian independence. In 1942, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill tasked Sir 
Stafford Cripps with traveling to India with a ‘draft declaration’ regarding post-war 




the dual task of finishing the fight against the Japanese and preparing the subcontinent for 
independence.98  
The Partition of India and the First IndoPak War  
Britain had much experience with the tactics of ‘divide and rule’ over the lifespan 
of its Empire—and the success of such measures undoubtedly accounted for much of 
how the country was able to control such an overwhelming amount of territory. But 
Britain had fewer answers as to the question of how to best navigate the resulting 
political landscape when it came time to leave. It also faced the competing philosophies 
of the ‘one-nation’ vs ‘two-nation’ theories: the first contested that future of the 
subcontinent should materialize into a secular, unified India, whereas the second argued 
that two separate countries needed forming for two “separate, incompatible” peoples.99 
Inherent in the ‘one-nation’ theory is the fundamental principle that the eventual Muslim 
state that emerged—Pakistan—has no justification for existing as a state at all, which 
alone represents a massive obstacle for meaningful negotiations between the two 
countries. 
The 1947 Partition of India is a substantial subject in its own right, but as it 
related to Kashmir, a few key issues were particularly at the forefront. To start, the 1941 
census found that the population of Jammu and Kashmir was seventy-seven percent 
Muslim, twenty percent Hindu, and one percent Sikh.100 For the Islamic state of Pakistan, 
this alone would represent a clear mandate for irredentism. The fact that the state lay 
directly next to the Pakistani border only strengthened this argument. However, this 
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school of thought is inconsistent with the rights granted to each of the princely states as 
outlined by the Cabinet Mission’s Memorandum of May 12th, 1946, which stated “The 
rights of the States which flow from their relationship with the Crown will no longer exist 
and that all the rights surrendered by the States to the paramount power will return to the 
States.”101 In essence, the newly independent states gained full powers of autonomy upon 
signing of the Partition, and this interpretation is further supported by the statement from 
Lord Mountbatten to the Princes on July 25th, 1947 that “the Indian Independence Act 
releases the States from all their obligations to the Crown. The States have complete 
freedom—technically and legally they are independent.” In no uncertain terms, Pakistan 
has never had legal entitlement to Kashmir outside the case of a potential accession that 
directly stemmed from Srinagar. This has never occurred. 
Furthermore, the assumption that the Kashmiris and their territory would neatly 
assimilate into Pakistan is flawed in its own right. The Kashmiris historically had a 
tremendous amount of distrust and disdain for the Punjabis—who were the dominant 
force of Pakistan and its leadership—and joining the country would likely result in a 
fierce hostility to the Kashmiri identity and traditions.102 In contrast, Kashmir could join a 
secular India and enjoy both protection of their distinctiveness and the superior 
socioeconomic opportunities—though this would come at the cost of joining a 
predominantly Hindu India as a stark Islamic outlier. When these dueling fates were 
paired with the option of simply maintaining independent Kashmiri sovereignty, it 
presented Maharaja Hari Singh with a challenging decision. 
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Which leads directly into another significant issue: the idea of who exactly should 
decide Kashmir’s fate. Britain had clearly outlined that this power reside with each newly 
independent state, but within that framework such power was specifically given to the 
respective state’s ruler. Lamb argues that this was a massive oversight by the British: 
Above all, the British had it in their power to do something about the 
Indian States. They could have at least ensured that the major Princely 
States acquired workable representative governments. This, alone, might 
well have avoided the Kashmir problem. A popular Kashmir Government 
could have made decisions about its future which both India and Pakistan 
would have respected. An autocratic and unpopular Maharaja…was in no 
position to make such decisions.103 
 
In fairness, Lamb’s assertion that Pakistan and India would have both entirely respected 
the decision of a fully democratic government may be wishful thinking, but it is difficult 
to defend the legitimacy of a decision made by an autocrat—one belonging to Kashmir’s 
overwhelming Hindu minority, no less—over that made by a popularly elected 
government of his citizens. While the holding of a plebiscite very clearly became part of 
future negotiations over Kashmir’s future, some sort of similarly democratic process from 
the start could indeed have had a very different impact than what unfolded in reality.  
 Both Pakistan’s and India’s cases and motivations for controlling Kashmir cut 
deep into the fabric of their identities. For Pakistan, Lamb points to three main grounds, 
starting with the religious implications which have already been stated. In short, from a 
strictly demographical standpoint, Kashmir’s clear Muslim majority mirrored that of its 
own religious composition. Secondly, Lamb cites the fact that Kashmir’s economy was 
more closely intertwined with Pakistan: “Its best communication with the outside world 
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lay through Pakistan, and this was the route taken by the bulk of its exports.”104 His third 
and final contention was that Pakistan’s agricultural sector—which was vitally important 
to the survival of the state—was heavily reliant on the waters of the Indus, Jhelum, and 
Chenab, and Kashmir was home to all three.  
 For India, Korbel argued that the importance of Kashmir was rooted in the fact 
that the territory represented a battleground over which light and darkness—Indian 
secularity and Pakistani Islamic theocracy, respectively—fought for supremacy. A loss in 
this duel is not simply a cession of territory, but quite literally an affront to the very 
foundation of Indian liberalism and democracy.105 This fact cuts deep enough into the 
Indian identity that it alone—even disregarding the various other political and economic 
factors at play—serves as more than enough merit for an absolutist orientation.  
 Under this backdrop, the Maharaja faced an imminent dilemma: in the late 
summer and fall of 1947, Pakistani trained and armed paramilitary forces joined together 
with rebellious Kashmiri Muslims and began raiding the northwesternmost front of 
Kashmir, with Pakistan hoping to strongarm the leader into ultimately acceding to them. 
With no chance to repel the invaders on his own—by October these tribesmen had 
captured and massacred their way to within four miles of Srinagar—the Maharaja and his 
family fled the capital and turned to India for assistance.106 Without consultation with 
Kashmir as a whole—a condition that was supposed to be part of the arrangement—the 
Maharaja signed an instrument of accession to India. Under this agreement, India would 
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send in its own military to repel enemy forces from Kashmir, and upon the end of 
hostilities would withdraw and allow for a plebiscite by the Kashmiri people.  
 This central fact has been repeatedly established in multiple official documents 
and testimonies. India’s reply to the Maharaja’s accession request read, in part, “The 
question of accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of 
the State, it is my Government’s wish that as soon as law and order have been restored in 
Kashmir and her soil cleared of the invader, the question of the State’s accession should 
be settled by a reference to the people.”107 The Government White Paper on Jammu and 
Kashmir affirmed this sentiment, saying, “in accepting the accession the Government of 
India made it clear that they would regard it as purely provisional until such time as the 
will of the people could be ascertained.”108 Furthermore, the Government of India’s 
official statement on October 30th clearly stated, “It is desirable to draw attention to the 
conditions on which the Government of India have accepted Kashmir’s accession…[the] 
people of the State should decide the question of accession.”  
 It is abundantly clear from these quotations that Kashmir’s accession to India had 
two main characteristics: it was entirely legal, and it was indisputably temporary. These 
two points are extremely important, and both Pakistan and India would have done well to 
acknowledge them moving forward. The same day as India’s October 30th statement, 
Pakistan responded that “the accession of Kashmir to the Indian Union is based on fraud 
and violence, and as such cannot be recognized.”109 The previously outlined evidence 
clearly points to the contrary. In the years that have followed, however, India has clearly 
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violated its own terms as well: Indian forces should have retreated following the formal 
end of hostilities, and the failure to do so into the modern day—not to even mention the 
2019 decision to revoke Article 370 and claim Kashmir as India proper—is an equal 
violation of objective truth. 
 Nevertheless, it was under these conditions that Indian troops would be airlifted 
into Srinagar in late October 1947 to defend against the invading forces. While Pakistan 
certainly had a hand in aiding the attacking forces—this would take the form of both 
logistical help as well the sending of disguised, active Pakistani military forces into the 
front lines—it was denied formal entry into the conflict by British commanding officers 
until 1948.110  Over the course of the war, Pakistan would make significant gains into 
Kashmir’s northern, High Himalayas range, but its forces would fail to break into the 
Kashmir Valley proper. Here, Indian forces would hold the line, and as 1948 progressed 
its army was able to take back much of the area previously captured by the Pakistani 
army. As the battle lines had largely frozen by late November, India and Pakistan would 
eventually agree to a ceasefire on December 31st that would be adopted by the United 
Nations Commission on India and Pakistan on January 5th. When the dust had settled, 
Pakistan had taken control of about one-third of Kashmir—but failed to capture the core 
cities and regions that made up the very fabric of the state. For this reason, the conflict is 
largely viewed as either inconclusive or a slight Indian victory due to the defender’s 
ability to maintain control of the war’s most hotly contested areas.111  
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 The UN resolution that brought an end to the war was initially adopted by the 
Commission in mid-August 1948. As it would later go on to be adopted in its final form, 
the proposal can effectively be broken down into three main phases: ceasefire, truce, and 
plebiscite. For at least the time being, India and Pakistan were able to successfully realize 
this first goal. However, it was the final two pillars that would prove harder to achieve. In 
essence, part two stated that as hostilities between the two belligerents had ended—along 
with the justification for occupying Indian forces to begin with—India would “withdraw 
the bulk” of its forces from Kashmir, leaving only just enough to adequately maintain law 
and order in the region.112 The third phase, the plebiscite, laid out the moral and already 
mutually agreed reasons for the need of Kashmiri self-determination, and presented a 
framework for the eventual referendum.   
 Immediately, the resolution hit several snares. To start, while the original wording 
of the agreement stated that Pakistani forces would withdraw from the region in the final 
phase, India argued that the size of Pakistan’s presence had since increased and thus 
demanded the withdrawal of the Azad fighters prior to their own. Pakistan pushed back 
on this argument. Furthermore, both countries fervently disagreed on the exact definition 
of the Commission’s vaguely defined “bulk” of Indian forces subject to removal. Clearly, 
the issues that had arisen stemmed from a lack of adequate trust on either side towards 
the other. This trust problem was not just limited between the two states, however: 
Mukherjee cites the external factors of the concurrent Cold War as playing a significant 
role as well.113 In short, Pakistan had already aligned itself with the Western powers, 
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while India had declined to choose between either the West or the Soviet Union. 
Contending that the UN represented an extension of American power, he argues that 
India viewed any plebiscite supervised by the organization as one that would unfairly 
favor Pakistan over itself.  
 While these talks stalled throughout 1949, India and Kashmir took two massive 
steps—the repercussions of which are still central to the conflict today. First, on the 
Indian government’s basis that “it would have been unfair to the Government and the 
people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to deny them the opportunity of participating 
in the discussion of” India’s new constitution while technically still under Indian 
accession, India admitted four Kashmiri representatives to the country’s Constituent 
Assembly—a move that drew outcry from Karachi.114 Second—and perhaps the most 
relevant—was the eventual move to adopt the Indian Constitution: namely, along with 
the inclusion of a special Article 370.  
 During debate over the formation of said Constitution, it became clear that 
Kashmir, though legally part of the Indian Union, required unique consideration due to 
the universally accepted temporary status of such membership. With this in mind, Article 
370 would grant the region semi-autonomous status that the other Indian states would not 
enjoy. For example, Kashmir would be able to fly its own flag, pass and enforce its own 
laws, and even adopt its own constitution. As such, India would only maintain control 
over the state in three particular areas: communications, foreign affairs, and defense. 
Similarly to India’s previous admittance of Kashmiri representatives to the Constituent 
Assembly, there were no actual legal barriers to taking such action; nothing about the text 
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of this article prevented an eventual plebiscite, and public statements from the 
government maintained that such a referendum was still the necessary path forward: 
At present, the legislature which was known as the Praja Sabha in the 
State is dead. But neither that legislature nor the Constituent Assembly can 
be convoked or can function until complete peace comes to prevail in that 
State. We have, therefore, to deal with the Government of the State which, 
as represented in its Council of Ministers, reflects the opinion of the 
largest political party in the State. Till a Constituent Assembly comes into 
being only an interim arrangement is possible and not an arrangement 
which could at once be brought into line with the arrangements existing in 
the case of other States. Now, if you remember the viewpoints that I have 
mentioned, it is an inevitable conclusion that, at the present moment, we 
could establish only an interim system. [Article 370] is an attempt to 
establish such a system.115 
 
 In the following years, India, Pakistan, and the UN would continue to 
unsuccessfully negotiate the terms that would bring forth a plebiscite—and the dignity of 
self-determination—for the Kashmiri people. It also was during this very time that the 
Kashmiris would begin to see a pattern that would continue well into the future: the 
gradual erosion of Article 370. For example, in 1964, Indian president Sarvepalli 
Radhakrishnan would issue a proclamation that transferred the power of government and 
legislation from Kashmir to the central government.116 Asserting that “the state’s 
inclusion in the union was complete, final and irrevocable,” the Indian government would 
continually back up Radhakrishnan’s sentiment, even going as far as to pressure the 
Kashmir state assembly to pass a bill that effectively eliminated the Kashmiri’s separate 
constitution in favor of falling under the jurisprudence of India’s in 1965.117 While 
Pakistan repeatedly cried foul at the international stage with each emergent step, much of 
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the issue laid within the Kashmir constituent assembly’s decision to dissolve in 1957 
without specifying whether Article 370 should be amended or abrogated—a reality that 
would go on to grant India’s judicial and political systems the “grey area” and flexibility 
needed to define the article in more Indian-favorable terms. 
Kashmir in Decline 
 By 1965, it was clear that the current state of IndoPak relations was untenable. 
Sheikh Abdullah, who by now had previously served—and been dismissed from—the 
role of Chief Minister of Kashmir, remained one of the most prominent and influential 
figures in the Kashmiri Muslim community. In response to a police shooting of protestors 
in Srinagar, he beseeched his compatriots to “defeat the purpose of those (Indians) who 
were trying to tighten the chains of slavery on the Muslims of Kashmir.”118 He would 
continue, “You cannot achieve freedom by imploring anybody, and in view of India’s 
present attitude, you have to think how to face her effectively.”119 His subsequent arrest 
only served to further fan the flames of domestic discontent, and India’s increasingly 
unstable position was only exacerbated by economic downturn and the recent loss to 
China in the Sino-Indian War just three years earlier. 
 Acutely aware of both the fruitlessness of further negotiations and their rival’s 
weakened position, Pakistan sent undercover troops across the Line of Control to train 
Kashmiri locals hoping to eventually incite a rebellion that would help Pakistan finally 
take Kashmir. When this plan—Operation Gibraltar—was uncovered by India, it, along 
with multiple explicit Pakistani offensives into Indian-controlled Kashmir, sparked the 
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second of the four eventual IndoPak wars. Though Pakistan had been careful to align its 
actions with what it perceived was a critically weak point in India’s young new history, it 
was quickly and easily defeated in the matter of about one month.  
 From an IndoPak point of view, the War of 1965 did not change much. While a 
lack of trust following the unravelling of Operation Gibraltar was inevitable, the existing 
deficit between the two sides was already substantial. The conflict certainly did nothing 
to improve relations, yet tempers would not immediately flare to the point of war again 
for several years. However, expanding the focus of examination here is key: as it pertains 
to the international stage, U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson’s decision to cut off arms 
shipments to both sides was seen as abandonment by India and Pakistan. Britain and the 
rest of the western powers largely followed America’s suit, and Riedel contends that both 
Pakistan and India still view this situation as proof that the United States and its allies 
will not come to their respective aid when the moment of need truly comes.120 
Definitively, he argues that “the legacy of the U.S. ‘betrayal’ still haunts [U.S.-Pakistan 
and U.S.-Indian] relations today."121 In an increasingly globalist international stage, 
situations like “The Troubles” in the British Isles have demonstrated the potential value 
of foreign intermediaries in resolving long standing, violent conflicts. This blemish in the 
relations between IndoPak and the West represents just one more obstacle in the already 
deeply complex struggle for peace in Kashmir. 
 The third IndoPak war would occur six years later in 1971. With aid from the 
Soviet Union—the Soviets had since aligned with the Indians and the Chinese with the 
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Pakistanis following the political fallout of the 1965 war—India sought to launch its own 
version of Operation Gibraltar in East Pakistan (the territory known today as 
Bangladesh). By this point, it was clear that the circumstances of each country had 
flipped. Pakistan was now embroiled in its own economic and political upheaval after 
failing to secure decisive victories in two straight IndoPak wars, and a comparatively 
strong India now recognized a window of opportunity to topple Pakistan’s eastern threat 
and narrow the battlefield of any future conflict to just one front: Kashmir. Though 
Pakistan had previously warned their neighbor that any incursion into East Pakistan 
would result in war, this did not deter India: officials in India expressed confidence that 
“India would enjoy the benefits, both within the region and beyond, of what would be an 
easy and humiliating defeat of Pakistan.”122  
 With this sentiment, Indian forces entered East Pakistan to support local guerrilla 
fighters in late November, and Pakistan indeed followed through with its response by 
attacking India from the west. The United States and its allies immediately called for 
peace upon the rekindling of hostilities for the third time in just 24 years, though their 
concerns would be short lived: the war would end just two weeks later when Pakistan 
signed what effectively amounted to a surrender—and with it the agreed secession of 
East Pakistan. Not only would the Indian hopes of a “humiliating defeat of Pakistan” be 
largely realized, the country had also captured a staggering ninety-one thousand prisoners 
of war in the fourteen days of fighting—an enormous embarrassment for Pakistan and a 
point of pride for the Indian military. Furthermore, the reworking of the original 1949 
Line of Control in Kashmir would be redrawn to represent the Line of Actual Control, 
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which granted India additional territorial claims on the west bank of the Kishinganga and 
the north bank of the Indus at the expense of Pakistan.123 This overall agreement would 
become known as the Simla Accord, and its terms left no doubt as to which country now 
enjoyed superiority over the Indian subcontinent. 
 The aftermath of the third IndoPak war would also have significant implications 
as it pertained to Article 370 and the prospects of Kashmiri self-determination. Though 
Part Six of the Simla Accord explicitly stated that “a final settlement of Jammu and 
Kashmir” was one of several issues that would be diplomatically determined at a later 
date, the rhetoric that would come from New Delhi took an increasingly hardline, pro-
India stance. Sheikh Abdullah was a leading Kashmiri voice pushing back against the 
Simla Accord’s implication that the future of Kashmir rested in the hands of anyone other 
than the Kashmiris themselves, but Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had seen her 
public standing and political capital skyrocket in the wake of a definitive Indian victory. 
She rejected the outcry from Kashmir, arguing vehemently that when it came to restoring 
Kashmir’s autonomy to levels seen in the early 1950s, “the clock could not be put back in 
this manner.”124  
 Understanding the reality that a great discrepancy in power existed between India 
and Kashmir, Sheikh Abdullah would eventually relent and sign the Indira-Sheikh 
Accord, which dropped the demand for a Kashmiri plebiscite in return for the retention of 
Article 370 and its uniquely semi-autonomous characteristics. In addition, Sheikh 
Abdullah was put back into the position of Chief Minister of Kashmir. Unsurprisingly, 
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when the terms of this agreement were made public in July 1975, there was large-scale 
outrage in both Kashmir and Pakistan. Particularly problematic was the language that 
Kashmir was now officially “a constituent unit of India,” and that the Indian government 
would retain significant ability to influence and exert its own lawmaking priorities in the 
territory.125 To this day, the move by Sheikh Abdullah has been described disparagingly 
as a major, damaging “capitulation” of Kashmiri rights to India.126 Though he would 
attempt to distance himself from the accord in the coming weeks, Sheikh Abdullah would 
watch as widespread protests, increasing fundamentalism, and undeniable instability 
began to unfold.127 
 These trends would only become exacerbated in the years that would follow. The 
final years of Sheikh Abdullah’s life and tenure of rule over Kashmir were defined by 
state violence and autocracy, and the administrations that would follow accomplished 
little in the way of restoring peace and stability. Allegations of fraudulent elections 
undermined Kashmiri faith in both their own leaders as well as India’s larger promise of 
democracy, and militancy was gradually becoming a more frequent outlet for the locals’ 
frustrations. Little would come in the way of positive developments for Kashmir—nor 
IndoPak relations—throughout the next decade, but the stakes would rise to an entirely 
new level by 1998. 
 In mid-May, the Indian government conducted five, unannounced underground 
tests of nuclear weapons. Though the international community was swift and severe in 
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denouncing India’s actions, Pakistan responded by conducting six tests of its own tests by 
the end of the month. The consequences of nuclear capabilities being introduced to a 
historically tense relationship that had already resulted in war three times in the last fifty 
years were plain—particularly as it related to the Kashmir question. In the words of 
Schofield:  
Amidst the renewed belligerency between India and Pakistan, the demands 
of the Kashmiri activists were rapidly receding from international 
consciousness. As both countries continued to test their long range 
missiles, which were capable of carrying nuclear warheads, the fear of a 
renewed arms race between India and Pakistan appeared to be far more 
alarming than the undefined and apparently unrealizable demands for self-
determination of the Kashmiris.128 
 
 Such fears hit new heights starting in the spring of the following year, when 
troops crossed the Line of Control into the Kargil district of Indian-controlled Kashmir, 
secured defense positions that the Indian military routinely left vacant during the winter 
months, and battled strongly against the ensuing counteroffensive. While Pakistan 
maintained firmly that these troops were simply “freedom fighters” with the goal of 
liberation for Kashmir, the Indian government was adamant that these troops had been 
trained, outfitted by, and even partially composed of Pakistani military personnel. On the 
international stage, sympathy for the Pakistani position was limited: the United States’ 
intelligence community largely corroborated India’s accusations, and even Pakistan’s 
most traditional allies like China were hesitant to come to its defense. Perhaps most 
damning, however, was the reality that even the Pakistani people “did not believe their 
[own] government’s explanation.”129 The fact that the militants were able to somewhat 
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hold their own against a superior Indian military worried many that this could lead to the 
conflict spilling across the Pakistani border, and it was widely understood that another 
conventional IndoPak war could lead to the first use of nuclear weapons since the Second 
World War.  
 Fighting would continue until July, when Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz 
Sharif—after deliberations with U.S. President Bill Clinton—made an adamant plea to 
the militants to withdraw from their positions. Central to this appeal was the fact that the 
conflict was no longer necessary as the world had once again turned its attention to the 
explosive potential of the Kashmir problem—the main goal of these fighters. While this 
announcement was met with anger from domestic Islamic fundamentalists who felt that 
the cause of annexing Kashmir was being abandoned, the argument that the fighters could 
technically claim victory did find its place in the political discourse. Meanwhile, across 
the border India was also able to claim victory due to the withdrawal of enemy forces 
from the battlefield—though the damage and losses suffered by its military were not to be 
understated. In October, Pakistani General Pervez Musharraf led a bloodless coup which 
replaced Nawaz Sharif, and though this move attracted its own wave of international 
criticism, Musharraf quickly laid out a seven-point plan for the de-escalation of border 
hostilities and improvement of overall IndoPak relations.130 In the end, India and Pakistan 
were able to avoid a full-blown, formally declared conventional war in the summer of 
1999, but the answer to the Kashmir question remained no closer to being answered than 
before. 
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 Since the turn of the millennium, IndoPak relations have not returned to the same 
level of tensions seen throughout the twentieth century. Internally, however, Kashmir has 
continued to resemble a territory gripped by conflict—one that at many points seems to 
be directed at the civilians themselves by the occupying forces. While this is certainly not 
a trend that began in the early 2000s, it is one that is becoming increasingly apparent in 
the modern, digital, globalized age. 
 State-sponsored violence and oppression against the Kashmiris are issues that 
stretch back to the earliest days after the accession to India in 1947. From the start, it was 
clear that opposition to India’s vision of the state’s future would hardly be tolerated. 
Sheikh Abdullah—who had initially gained New Delhi’s favor due to his early support of 
an accession to India and rejection of the “two-nations” theory—was dismissed and 
arrested from his post as elected chief minister once doubts began to arise as to his 
loyalty to India. Upon his eventual release four years later, he would almost instantly be 
imprisoned again for an additional six after taking a public stand in favor of a 
plebiscite—and this time his detention would be paired with a large trial of twenty-five 
other dissenters on the grounds of conspiracy.131 
The hardline stance against dissent that the government of Bakshi Ghulam 
Muhammad took over the next decade would resemble few characteristics of a healthy 
democracy. Against the backdrop of 1962’s illegitimate election that served to preserve 
the status of the autocratic regime, freedom of the press was stripped away to quell the 
spread of information critical of those in power. As for the citizens themselves, one of 
Bakshi’s former associates turned political opponent commented that “the government 
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agents forced hot potatoes into the mouths of their opponents, put heavy stones on their 
chest; and branded them with hot irons.”132 
The year 1978 was particularly notable define Kashmiri’s present state of civil 
society. On April 8th, the once again Sheikh Abdullah-led government would introduce 
the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act. Though similar preventative detention acts 
had existed in the region in the form of the Public Security Act of 1946 and the 
Preventative Detention Act of 1954, this method of policing soared under Sheikh 
Abdullah as a tool to detain his political rivals—a strategy that would continue to be 
embraced by future leaders.133 Specifically, the language of the law allowed for the 
imprisonment of a suspect without trial for a maximum of two years for acting against the 
“security of the state,” and one year for “acting in any manner prejudicial to the 
maintenance of public order;” these terms would only be amended to a respective six 
months and three months by default in 2012.134 A clearer picture of the law’s power 
emerged in 2015 when the Indian government released the statistic that 16,329 
individuals had been detained in this manner since 1988.135 Almost all of these arrests 
occurred in Kashmir. 
A few other laws originating from the twentieth century play in important role in 
modern Kashmir. The first of which, the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), 
was first enacted in 1958 and evolved into a Kashmir-specific piece of legislation in 
1990. In essence, the law allows Indian armed forces to declare a “disturbed area” where 
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public order is perceived to be lacking. Within these areas, soldiers are permitted to 
search homes or make arrests without a warrant, and even open fire on those seen as a 
threat. Of particular note, those involved with killings of civilians associated with the law 
are granted immunity from future prosecution. This final point in particular has raised the 
ire of human rights advocates around the world, as they argue it has prevented justice in 
countless unjust civilian killings over the years.136  
A related law is the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act: a counterterrorism law 
from 1967 that was most recently amended in August 2019. While already decried as 
draconian for its alleged misuse in targeting social activists and religious minorities, the 
2019 changes now allow individuals to be designated as “terrorists” and likewise 
detained without charges nor trial for six months with no opportunity for bail.137 
Described as India’s now foremost anti-terror law, use has escalated dramatically as an 
alternative to the PSA due to the facts that PSA detentions are much easier to overturn 
and that the UAPA ultimately allows the security forces to remove individuals for longer. 
“Now armed with a more draconian law, the government uses it to detain people who are 
a political threat or dissenting,” according to Khurram Parvez, chairman of the Jammu 
and Kashmir Coalition of Civil Societies.138  
 Violent crackdowns on protests like the aforementioned 1965 incident have been 
common throughout Kashmir’s occupied history. In the eyes of the Indian government, 
militant insurgencies like the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front have created a 
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justification for the use of deadly force in securing the territory; one stark example of this 
sentiment came from Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who, after the 2010 
discovery that three villagers near the Line of Control had been murdered “in cold blood” 
by soldiers, argued that “in a difficult situation, innocent people sometimes ‘have to 
suffer.’”139 The modern insurgency in Kashmir began to take on its modern form by the 
end of the 1980s, and in the period from 1990-2010, 70,000 Kashmiri civilians were 
killed by India’s security apparatus in their own “war on terror.”140  
 While such death tolls may be able to provide some empirical evidence as to the 
situation in Kashmir—though the credibility of the government’s estimates is another 
debate in of itself—these figures are simply unable to demonstrate the full extent of what 
the civilian population has been endured. Human rights abuses in the region by 
paramilitary outfits have attracted international criticism, and though allegations of rape, 
torture, murder, and more are common, no clear statistics regarding their prevalence are 
readily available as legislation like the Armed Forces Special Powers Act grants impunity 
those even accused of such acts. With over 500,000 Indian troops present in Kashmir 
even before the events of 2019, life in and around the valley resembled that of a country 
at war. While India may view its occupation as one premised on the need for peace, 
order, and stability, those who have lived under its rule for over seventy years have yet to 
see any of these buzzwords truly realized. And with the advent and development of 
digital means of oppression like internet blackouts, India has discovered the potential of 
these technologies to supplement—not replace—their current repressive strategies. 
 
 
















For the purpose of this analysis, Chapter Four is broken down into two main 
thematic sections: instances where the Indian government utilized physical repression 
(violence, torture, imprisonments, etc.), and instances where the Indian government 
utilized digital authoritarianism. In Chapter Five, discussion will center on how these two 
styles of oppression have intertwined, what the impact is for the people of Kashmir, and 
what the implications are for these developments at the international level. Both thematic 
sections will examine the respective associated techniques within the context of Chapter 
Two’s five aforementioned goals of autocrats; understanding each’s strengths and 
weaknesses will further unveil where the two styles of oppression overlap—as well as 
how one may help bolster the effectiveness of the other.  
To achieve this, information was compiled from a variety of different sources, 
including but not limited to activists, reporters, the global diaspora, and firsthand 
accounts from Kashmiris on social media platforms like Twitter. As alluded to in the 
prior chapter, attaining exact statistics of human rights abuses is essentially impossible 
due to the closed nature of Kashmir to the outside world by India, so the body and quality 
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of available information is frequently fragmentary and only estimable. Figures are often 
sourced from NGOs, such as Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Jammu Kashmir 
Coalition of Civil Society (JKCCS). Additionally, a limitation of this study is the author’s 
unilinguality: because of this, the available pool of resources is further narrowed to those 
written in the English language.  
The initial aim of this thesis was to focus primarily on the Twitter activity of 
Kashmiris immediately following the March restoration of internet services in the valley. 
By scraping the body of Tweets originating from Kashmir over a period of one week and 
analyzing a sample of about one hundred per day, one could begin to understand the 
immediate priorities of the Kashmiri people once they were again connected to the 
outside world. Furthermore, it is within this early timeframe that personal accounts of 
abuse by Indian security forces would most likely arise due to concerns of another 
shutdown and the resultant inability to tell one’s story in the near future. With this 
dataset, it could begin to be extrapolated just how prevalent these negative experiences 
with security forces were during the shutdown, and what impact the shutdown had in 
achieving the autocratic goals laid out in Chapter two.  
However, several significant issues quickly arose with this approach. To start, 
Twitter has recently removed access to much of the tweet metadata that would be 
necessary in order to conduct such a review (such as location, even as broadly defined as 
“Kashmir”). Even if this metadata could still be retrieved, the growing popularity of 
VPNs in Kashmir would have masked the true extent of the body of Kashmiri tweets.142 
This fact alone would make the prospect of claiming an accurate measurement dubious at 
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best, especially as it would be impossible to gauge just how many tweets were missing in 
total. 
Moreover, to scrape tweets in this nature in the first place, only an original 
computer code could properly run and execute the task; the author did not have the 
knowledge to create this, and practical and logistical obstacles stood in the way of hiring 
a computer scientist. Therefore, the original proposal of using a large swath of Twitter 
data as the central focus of the thesis shifted into utilizing a smaller, narrower sample for 
supplementary purposes instead. 
Over the course of the project, a collection of relevant Kashmiri journalists, 
activists, NGOs, and local politicians were identified through a process similar in nature 
to snowball sampling, After the creation of an initial list of 23 prominent Kashmiri 
Twitter accounts ranging from the categories above—primarily discovered by mining the 
popular hashtags #Kashmir and #PrayForKashmir—these accounts were analyzed one-
by-one with Twitter’s advanced search feature. The terms searched for included the 
verbatim queries of “killings,” “torture,” “rape,” “state violence,” “surveillance,” 
“drones,” “mass imprisonments,” and “internet shutdown”—along with varied 
synonymous phrasings in order to both increased relevant results as well as ensure the 
data was not overly skewed towards a sample of individuals only critical of the 
government. By analyzing the content of the results stemming from these initial accounts 
(which typically came in the form of links to external sites), a much greater body of 
information became available for the ensuing research. Among the dozens of new 
Kashmiri activists, journalists, and media accounts yielded by this search method, NGO 
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reports, studies, and data were particularly referenced—especially the Jammu and 
Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society.  
As alluded to above, such a method of sampling does create the potential that the 
information being analyzed could be overly biased against the Indian government. To 
help account for this, responses from the Indian government towards specific allegations 
cited in the thesis were sought wherever possible and included alongside the specific 
accusation. Though the bias and credibility of those making allegations could somewhat 
reasonably be called into question, many of their accounts have been cited from 
internationally recognized publications such as The Washington Post. These same news 
organizations were faced with the same questions before running each respective story, 
especially in the earliest days of the lockdown where information leaving the valley was 
dramatically reduced. In large part due to the systematic effort of the central government 
to suppress non-Indian supported narratives, these organizations found that these stories 
met the criteria necessary for publication; oftentimes, this journalistic justification would 
preface said story. Overall, this active effort to pair allegations with opposing 
viewpoints—specifically seeking out accusations that accredited, career journalists found 
reputable for publication—was to ensure that the analysis produced as fair and easily 
replicable of a conclusion as possible.  
Of course, the combination of all the above factors makes it impossible that this 
project or its collection of sources could ever provide a complete picture of the true state 
of Kashmir. Nevertheless, both the ongoing nature of Kashmir’s 2019 blackout and the 
lack of comprehensive academia on the subject (two dynamics which are surely related) 
demands that some level of analysis be undertaken—even if it may be imperfect. Ideally, 
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this preliminary investigation into the subject will highlight deeper, more specific 
questions that future research can address with the benefit of greater time and resources. 
Physical Repression 
Extrajudicial Killings 
When examining physical repression in Kashmir, it makes sense to begin with the 
technique first analyzed by Guriev and Treisman: politically motivated killings. To be 
clear, the “mass killings” that the two specify as the deaths of more than one thousand 
noncombatants are not currently happening, nor have they in any recent history. In 2019, 
368 individuals were killed during Indian counter-insurgency operations in Kashmir; 
among those, only 80 have been classified as civilians.143 While this by no means makes 
these deaths any less tragic or reprehensible, it is also not indicative of a reality where the 
Indian government is targeting Kashmiris at a rate which can justifiably be classified as 
mass killing. In observing the larger trend over the 21st century, civilian deaths had been 
falling dramatically since 2002. While JKCCS identified 968 cases that year, the annual 
figure has not exceeded 200 since 2006.144  
That said, what has not diminished over this period is the effect of these killings 
on the Kashmiri people. Last year, JKCCS wrote that “while extra-judicial killings of 
civilians in 2019 saw a downward trend, the pattern has remained the same. Civilians 
continue to be the direct target of the armed forces as well as, [are] seen at par with 
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armed militants, as data has shown.”145 This contention that civilians are being 
deliberately targeted by India is consistent with findings by HRW as far back as the 
earlier stages of the insurgency in 1995:  
While attempting to reassure the international community that they have 
taken steps to curb human rights abuses in Kashmir, Indian forces have in 
effect subcontracted some of their abusive tactics to groups with no 
official accountability. The extrajudicial killings, abductions and assaults 
committed by these groups against suspected militants are instead 
described as resulting from “intergroup rivalries.” But civilians have also 
been their victims, and the militia groups have singled out journalists, 
human rights activists and medical workers for attack.146 
  
This observation that India is sponsoring third parties to commit violence on the 
government’s behalf is extremely important. Frankly, it is impossible to absolve India of 
blame in civilian deaths in Kashmir on the sole basis that official state security forces 
were not present during an incident if the groups carrying out such actions have been 
greenlighted by the state in the first place. HRW emphasizes this relationship in the same 
report: 
In some cases, attacks by these paramilitary groups appear to have been 
carried out on orders from security officers; in other cases, the groups 
appear to operate on their own, within broadly defined limits to their 
discretionary powers and the full expectation on the part of the security 
forces that they will use their discretion to take initiatives within the 
overall counterinsurgency strategy of fighting terror with terror. Their 
actions are taken with the knowledge and complicity of official security 
forces.147 
 
At the very least, this may mean India could be considered an accessory for Kashmiri 
deaths at the hands of any militarized forces. One may even be able to argue that India 
bears almost complete responsibility for such bloodshed.  
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 Indian explanations for civilian deaths often run contrary to family and 
eyewitness accounts. For example, when a twenty-five-year-old was shot and killed in 
May at a security checkpoint in Srinagar, India’s Central Reserve Police Force released a 
statement that the victim was shot “when the car didn’t stop despite warning shots.”148 
This was refuted by a witness who, in an interview with Deutsche Welle, explained that 
the car had indeed stopped, and that “a security official told him something to which he 
replied that he had some emergency. They let him go but as he was getting into his 
vehicle, they shot him in the back. He was killed deliberately.”149 The victim’s father 
corroborated this: “Had soldiers fired at his vehicle while fleeing any checkpoint, his car 
would have got bullet marks.”150 
 A remarkably similar incident occurred in July, when a sixty-five-year-old was 
killed in front of his three-year-old grandson. When police initially identified the victim, 
they explained that the man had been caught in crossfire of a skirmish between militants 
and state security forces while trying to flee the scene.151 The man’s family disputed this 
with their own accusation that the security forces had removed the man from his car and 
shot him on the spot. They also question why the car had not been touched if it had truly 
been caught in crossfire.152 
 Mass killings are almost impossible to completely cover up: China failed to do so 
with its massacre at Tiananmen Square, and it is arguably the most successful regime in 
the world at controlling the flow of information. This reality makes it is unsurprising that 
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India would decide against such measures within Kashmir. Instead, they have largely 
opted for mostly nonlethal measures such as tear gas and shotgun pellets when 
confronted by large crowds, saving lethal encounters for more isolated incidents where 
eyewitnesses are few and the circumstances allow for the story to be muddied in the 
eventual aftermath. Just as JKCCS previously stated, the trend of extrajudicial killings as 
a state strategy of repression has remained consistent throughout the conflict, and it has 
shown no indication of receding in the near future.  
 In terms of the five goals of autocrats, these targeted killings may not serve the 
interests of surveillance, regime legitimization, or spreading misinformation, but they 
absolutely succeed in creating fear and eliminating operational capacity. On the subject 
of regime legitimization alone, civilian deaths were outlined in previous chapters as 
actually delegitimizing a standing regime in the eyes of its people. As it relates to fear, 
though, it is not hard to draw the line between how a Kashmiri may be fearful of 
interactions with security forces when a friend, family member, or person in the news has 
been slain. Uzma Javed—a twenty-year-old from Srinagar—described this very fear to Al 
Jazeera shortly after the abrogation of Article 370: “The sight of armed forces ‘petrifies 
me,’ she said, adding ‘I don’t even want my brother and father to go out at all but there is 
no option. They need to go to get bread and other daily necessities.’”153 The hesitancy to 
even put oneself in a position of interaction with these forces plays directly into the 
elimination of dissident operational capacity as well: if there are not enough willing to 
directly push back at the state, the critical mass needed to force change may be 
unattainable.  
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Torture and Rape 
 Just as state killings have remained a consistent strategy of repression, other gross 
human rights violations such as torture and rape have found continued usage over the 
years by the security apparatus as well. Last year, the Washington Post reported one such 
incident that had allegedly occurred the day after the abrogation of Article 370. After 
being questioned by Indian soldiers, 25-year-old Yassin Bhat was ordered to remove his 
clothes in the middle of a road.154 He was subsequently held down and beaten, and 
shocked by electrical wires which had been forced on his chest and genitals. He and four 
other naked men were beaten for about two hours, and soon after being forced to lie on 
top of each other Bhat fainted. Though he told the Post that “I thought it would be my 
last night,” he was eventually retrieved by neighbors upon the soldiers’ departure.155 
Photographic evidence and hospital records challenge the Indian army’s statement that 
the cases outlined the Post’s story are “baseless.”156 
 Less than one month after the August 2019 crackdown, the BBC managed to 
circumvent India’s ban on international media in Kashmir and speak to local residents 
regarding their experiences with the security forces. In a story eerily similar to Bhat’s, 
one young man recounted being asked to “name the stone-throwers.” After responding 
that he did not know any, he was stripped of his clothing and beaten with rods and sticks 
for two hours—electrocuted awake when slipping into unconsciousness.157 Another man 
described being beaten by “15-16 soldiers,” with “cables, guns, sticks and probably iron 
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rods.”158 While he said that his beard was pulled so hard “it felt like my teeth would fall 
out,” he was later told by a witness that one solider attempted to act further by setting the 
beard on fire—only stopped by another solider. Still another described being beaten so 
badly that he was still unable to lie on his back weeks after.159 In their own interviews, 
two brothers said they pleaded with their torturers, “don’t beat us, just shoot us.”160  
While all the interviewees stated that they believed the security forces did this in 
an attempt to scare villagers from participating in protests—one even alleged his village 
was specifically threatened with future beatings if protests occurred—the Indian army 
responded just as they had to the Post’s questioning: “No specific allegations of this 
nature have been brough to our notice,” and that the accusations were “baseless and 
unsubstantiated.”161 
 Such allegations against India are anything but uncommon in Kashmir. In late 
2010, WikiLeaks published private dispatches from the US embassy in Delhi that 
detailed secret Red Cross briefings on human rights abuses in Kashmir. In 177 visits 
between 2002 and 2004 where the organization privately interviewed 1,296 detainees, 
681 reported anywhere from one to over six different forms of torture—including ceiling 
suspension, leg crushing and stretching, electrocutions, water-based, and sexual acts.162 
These 681 detainees reported over 1,890 separate personal incidents, and the Red Cross 
concluded that the victims were all civilians as militants were typically killed instead of 
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Though this report focused particularly on detainees, accounts such as Bhat’s 
demonstrate how torture can happen as spontaneously as finding someone walking in the 
street. His story also illustrates how torture has clearly not been abandoned since the Red 
Cross’s investigation in 2004. The United Nations has repeatedly been audience to torture 
allegations against Indian security forces, and in May published its own findings that the 
status of human rights in Kashmir was not just poor, but in a “continued [state of] 
deterioration.”164 JKCCS’s 2019 report on Kashmir takes this assessment further, arguing 
that torture is not only “used indiscriminately by the Indian armed forces and J&K Police 
in J&K to punish or intimidate people,” but that the practice has become so normalized 
that it is rarely reported in Kashmiri media anymore.165 While each year brings with it a 
new set of stories and allegations, this reality JKCCS illuminates strongly suggests that 
the outside world will never learn the true extent of torture in Kashmir.  
Many similarities can also be drawn to the weaponization of rape by Indian 
security forces. Even when counterinsurgency operations were just in the process of 
intensifying in the early 1990s, Asia Watch was among many sounding the alarm bell as 
to the prevalence of this tactic. In their comprehensive 1993 report on the matter, the 
organization called the usage of rape by security forces as “frequent,” and that it most 
commonly occurred during cordon-and-search operations where men were temporarily 
taken from their homes and the women left alone—as well as for a retaliatory measure 
following nearby militant ambushes.166 The motivation, according to Asia Watch, is to 
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“punish and humiliate the entire community.”167 Their reporting on this issue illustrates 
the consistency of this tactic’s use by Indian security forces throughout Kashmir’s recent 
history; this consistency may suggest that the forces’ leaders perceive that rape still holds 
value as a means to quell dissent.   
 While there are already distinct challenges in finding accurate empirical evidence 
for crimes as underreported as rape, it is especially important to understand the 
circumstances that amplify this reality in Kashmir. To start, the Indian government’s lack 
of urgency in addressing the issue—or perhaps more appropriately, the demonstrated 
pattern of condoning such actions through coverups and lack of accountability—
immediately turns off victims from even raising the issue in the first place. Though the 
Kunan Poshpora mass rape of 1991 remains one of the most infamous human rights 
violations by Indian security forces throughout the conflict, the Indian government still 
refuses to acknowledge the incident and has actively impeded investigations and court 
proceedings to this day.168  
Looking at the weaponization of rape more broadly, Fatima particularly cites the 
fetishization and dehumanization of Kashmiri women—a trend she argues has been 
exacerbated and encouraged by Indian legislative policy like the AFSPA169—as the 
foundation of an environment where these crimes can run rampant.170 This is especially 
dangerous when paired with dismissive attitudes towards rape by authority figures, such 
as former Jammu and Kashmir deputy chief minister Kavinder Gupta’s comments in 
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response to a 2018 accusation against security forces: “[it was] a minor incident and need 
not be hyped.”171 Mushtaq contends that the combination of these factors and more 
suggests that “the act of sexual violence and murder cannot and must not be seen outside 
of the Indian state’s nation-building project over a territory that questions the legitimacy 
of its rule.”172   
All of this speaks to much of why the Indian security force’s reputation to torture 
and rape is so effective at stoking fear in Kashmir: under the current environment of 
impunity, it is unlikely that past, present, or future victims will ever receive true justice 
for their tribulations. Furthermore, the lack of meaningful progress on the issue since the 
Red Cross’ 2004 warning proves that the issue is not a strong priority of Western powers 
that could potentially force change from the outside through tariffs and other means. 
Without external pressure, there is no real incentive for India to change a largely effective 
behavior. In the valley, there is an immense cost not just for acting against the 
government, but sometimes simply being in the wrong place at the wrong time as the case 
of Bhat shows. As JKCCS stated, torture is expressly used by the security apparatus to 
intimidate, and the isolated social media and journalistic accounts that do manage to 
emerge from a suppressed Kashmir prove that the tactic is working. 
 This creation of a culture of fear also aids in the goal of eliminating the organized 
dissent’s operational capacity: similarly to the effect of killings, if the security forces can 
scare potential protestors enough that they will not act against the state, the critical mass 
needed to facilitate change becomes much more difficult to attain. Beyond these to 
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achievements, though, such human rights violations are unable to help in the realization 
of the other four autocratic goals. Torture and rape do not spread misinformation, help 
surveille the population, or legitimize the regime. This indicates that while torture may be 
a powerful tool within the niche it does fill, it needs to fit within a larger, holistic strategy 
to reach its maximum effectiveness. 
Physical Surveillance 
 One technique that can augment torture and rape in this way is the substantial 
escalation of physical surveillance since the revocation of Article 370. Prior to last 
August, drones were a valuable tool for patrolling the Line of Control as well the valley’s 
biggest protests, but ownership and usage was largely exclusive to the Indian military. 
Since the crackdown, though, police have been rapidly outfitted with the most up-to-date 
equipment available. In October 2019, an anonymous Indian official told Outlook that 
“The drone MAVIC2 has an excellent speed; 75 km per hour and it can carry 1.2 kg 
payload. I think it has sensors that can also detect weapons. If you are able to fly it like an 
expert, it is of great use for the law and order and surveillance.”173 Perhaps ominously for 
the Kashmiri people, he added that “we are just in the process of learning its benefits.”174 
 One year later, the evidence that India has embraced these benefits is clear. In 
December 2020, one hundred more drones were budgeted out for local police to be 
dispersed in the coming months.175 Another anonymous Indian source stated that “The 
procurement of 100 drones is just a beginning and in the months ahead, each police 
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station will be covered…The UAVs or drone system will be of category three which is 
considered the latest and equipped with the technology required by the police especially 
in Kashmir given its terrain and mountainous region.”176  
At the start of the crackdown, these drones were mostly utilized in southern 
Kashmir where protests were most fervent. In Anchar, for instance, security forces used 
them to fly above roadblocks that made the village inaccessible from the outside and 
scout the identity of protestors along with their most likely routes.177 Kashmiris would 
soon learn the fruitlessness of attempting to reach high-flying drones or covering their 
faces when outside, though. Last year in Srinagar, a woman named Aliya was arrested 
and interrogated after being identified by the color of her dress.178 In another part of the 
city, several men were surrounded on a bridge by security forces and attempted to flee by 
jumping into the river—resulting in the drowning of one.179 The effectiveness of the 
police’s drone usage will only increase in the future as in-depth training from experts is 
expected to be part of the new drone rollout in 2021 and beyond, according to other 
officials speaking off the record.180 
Drones are far from the only means in which security forces have sought to track 
the Kashmiri population. As part of a more widespread, static surveillance infrastructure, 
thousands of CCTV cameras have been installed throughout the valley since last August. 
In October, Bandipora deputy commissioner Owais Ahmad implemented the following 
order: “to keep an eye on anti-social elements and their acts thereof, there is a need for 
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additional surveillance measures which include installation & extensive usage of CCTV 
cameras in public places, offices with adequate data storage capacity.”181 Particularly of 
note is the demand that “the CCTV HDD (storage device) shall be always kept available 
for the usage of Law Enforcing Agencies as and when requisitioned.”182 This directive 
aligns closely with the Kashmir Police’s larger December initiative, which plans for the 
installation of three thousand cameras in all twenty districts and along the Jammu-
Srinagar National Highway—an effort aided in large part by the United Kingdom-based 
consultant company Ernst and Young.183 
The effectiveness of these combined surveillance measures has not been lost on 
the Kashmiris. One Anchar resident discussed the progression of Kashmiri attitudes in an 
anonymous interview. At first, he said that “people were surprised as they saw the drones 
flying over their heads during protests. They would cover their faces on spotting the 
drone. Some would try to chase it but it flew too high.”184 However, as these technologies 
have expanded, he explained that people no longer even bother to cover their faces. 
“Drones are here now every day,” according to Nazir Ahmad, another resident. “They are 
tracking our every movement in this area…On Eid, we had five helicopters in the area for 
aerial surveillance. We heard Ajit Doval [India’s national security advisor] was in 
one.”185 
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 Obviously, the main purpose of these measures is to surveille the Kashmiri 
population—something neither extrajudicial killings nor torture and rape are particularly 
helpful in achieving. While the technique fails to accomplish two of the other main 
autocratic goals—misinformation spread and regime legitimization—its ability to 
promote the other two are less clear. On the subject of creating fear, it is easy to imagine 
how the state of constant surveillance would make a potential protestor fearful of 
demonstrating as security forces would likely be able to later track them down—resulting 
in a prolonged detention, inescapable torture, or even death. That said, the relative 
dismissiveness of the everyday Kashmiri in hiding their face from drones suggests that 
the tactic is no longer as feared by the public—though this would seemingly increase the 
effectiveness of future surveillance exponentially. As it relates to elimination of 
dissenters’ operational capacity, cameras are quite clearly unable to achieve this on their 
own. However, the opportunities opened up by the information they collect make this 
goal much more easily attained through the use of other techniques: namely, 
imprisonments and detentions.  
Mass Imprisonments and Detentions 
 One of the most immediate action items of the Indian government in Kashmir 
following the revocation of Article 370 was the swift, targeted, and widespread detention 
of civilians in every corner of the valley. Though the laws that provided a legal path for 
these mass imprisonments have been existent for decades—namely, the PSA and 
UAPA186—the extent to which they were utilized was consistent with the government’s 
traditional strategy of weaponizing them most in times of significant political unrest or 
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civilian uprisings.187 For instance, JKCCS reported “hundreds of fresh detentions under 
PSA” had taken place in 2018; this is an unmistakably large number for any society 
operating under the pretense of “democracy,” but one dwarfed by more politically 
turbulent years like 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2016 (the latter of which saw over eight 
thousand arrests alone).188  
 In an alarmingly rapid blow to Kashmiri civil society, up to four thousand people 
were immediately arrested and held under the PSA in the first two weeks after Article 
370’s revocation—a figure constituting at least half of the total number previously 
arrested in all of 2016.189 However, that number fluctuated depending on the source: 
while one anonymous security official was responsible for leaking that four thousand 
figure, another told AFP off-the-record that “around 6,000 people were medically 
examined at a couple of places in Srinagar after they were detained.”190 Still another 
anonymously estimated “thousands,” jailed, but stressed that this number “did not include 
other residents whose detentions at police stations had not been recorded.191 One of the 
highest figures has come from an all-woman fact-finding team whose on-the-ground 
research contended that about thirteen thousand had been taken in the weeks immediately 
before and after the lockdown—many of who had not been documented.192 
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 Though the targets varied widely in background and occupation—including but 
not limited to academics, journalists, political leaders, and activists—they all had one 
trait in common: their freedom was deemed threatening to the attempted submission of 
Kashmir by the Indian government. While some of these arrested in the first wave had a 
history of participation in local protests, those who practice nonviolence were not spared 
from the ones taken into custody under suspicion of violent action. The police official 
responsible for the six thousand figure disclosed the process in which these detentions are 
carried out, explaining that after being sent to the central jail in Srinagar detainees are 
flown thousands of miles away by military aircraft to India proper.193 In the bigger 
picture, the broadness of the net the Indian government has casted when designating such 
threats is especially concerning as almost anyone could be seemingly painted as 
“dangerous” when free. 
An internal government report from September 6 seen by Reuters pegged the 
number of arrested Kashmiris at 3,800, though it was estimated that 2,600 had been 
released within the month.194 However, international NGOs continued to plea for justice 
in 2020, demanding that the “hundreds” still detained in the jails and prisons scattered 
across India be released. These calls would become greatly amplified after March as the 
spread of COVID-19 exploded globally, and those confined within the Indian prison 
system were not spared from exposure. 
Traditionally, Indian prisons have gained a reputation for operating well beyond 
their intended capacity. In 2019, the average occupancy rate of those in India was 114 
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percent, and Kashmir’s Director General of Prisons stated in July 2020 that “we have the 
capacity to lodge 3,234 prisoners in our jails but presently our occupancy is above 
3,659.”195 Domestic activists have such as Khuram Parvez contended that the reluctance 
to release Kashmiris awaiting trial was indicative of the government’s larger strategy to 
harm and repress: “the approach of the government has been vindictive towards Kashmiri 
prisoners. These people are being punished without trials and COVID-19 didn’t deter the 
government from ending its belligerence when it comes to Kashmiris.”196  
Incremental progress was made early in the pandemic after an Indian Supreme 
Court directive led a committee to order the release of jail inmates not involved in 
militancy-related cases (236 were released between April 1st and April 19th), but to this 
day a large number of Kashmiris remain missing from the valley—a count unlikely to 
ever accurately surface. Aliya, the previously discussed Srinagar women who had been 
identified and arrested from the color of her dress, is still missing her husband—one of 
presumably thousands of Kashmiris who have no idea as to the whereabouts (not to 
mention the status of their potentially jeopardized existence) of their loved ones. In an 
op-ed published by The Guardian, one Kashmiri mother pleaded directly to the Indian 
government at the start of the crackdown: “I want every single mother in Kashmir and 
other places whose sons have been forcibly disappeared to get answers to the questions 
that haunt them: where is my child? Where did you take them? Bring the dead body if 
you killed them—but for God’s sake bring them back.”197 
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In again relating India’s tactics to the five goals of autocrats, these mass 
detentions do not legitimize the regime nor spread misinformation. On the other hand, the 
risk of disappearance thousands of miles from home with no concrete timetable for return 
quite easily creates fear among not just open dissenters, but the loved ones who care and 
rely upon them as well. While one may be able to argue at an abstract, technical level that 
imprisonments allow the Indian government to easily track their top perceived targets in a 
jail cell, these measures do little on their own to increase surveillance over the population 
as a whole. However, mass imprisonments’ ability to eliminate the dissent’s operational 
capacity becomes much stronger by contextualizing the detentions within the larger 
surveillance infrastructure of the Indian security apparatus. In this regard, it seems highly 
likely that the effectiveness of the mass imprisonment tactic is strengthened exponentially 
by the information gathered by constant drone and CCTV coverage.  
At this point, the effectiveness of the differing means of repression in achieving 
the five goals of autocrats has become much clearer. However, as valuable as this 
information may be, it is not the main focus of the thesis; rather, how does the existence 
of internet technologies and avenues of digital authoritarianism affect these tactics usage? 
Considering these four tactics underneath the larger umbrella of “physical repression,” 
does digital authoritarianism strengthen this broader strategy? Or does it instead weaken 
it? Does digital authoritarianism augment physical repression in a way that may incline 
an autocrat to maintain or increase their use of violence? Or, as scholars like Guriev and 
Treisman suggest, is the potential effectiveness of digital authoritarianism enough to 
actually warrant the gradual abandonment of physical repression in favor of technological 
tactics? To appropriately answer these questions, the strengths and weaknesses of digital 
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authoritarianism as it relates to the five goals of autocrats must be fully analyzed. It is 
from that point that these advantages and shortcomings can be compared to those of 
physical repression, and the overall effects revealed from their intersection.  
Digital authoritarianism  
 By no means should the focus of this section on internet shutdowns be 
misconstrued as an implication that blackouts are the only digitally authoritarianist 
measure worthy of academic consideration within the context of this thesis’ research 
question. In fact, that is one major direction that future research on this subject should 
take: how does the prevalence of other tactics such as filtering and flooding contribute to 
the effectiveness and usage of physical repression in other regimes? That said, the 
outsized attention given to internet shutdowns is largely predicated on the fact that by the 
very nature of a blackout these tactics cannot truly coexist. Simply put, if a population 
has no access to internet services, there is no body of information to filter or flood in the 
first place.  
 Of course, this is not to say that the Kashmiris have been completely isolated 
from the internet since the digital curtain fell in August 2019. Throughout the next year, 
coverage gradually returned in certain areas of the valley, and trips to government-
approved computer terminals were at least somewhat common for numerous individuals 
as months went by in order to complete time sensitive tasks like paying taxes and 
applying for colleges. In those controlled environments, other forms of digital 
authoritarianism were absolutely rampant.  
Overall, though, the practically unusable internet speeds can effectively be 
characterized as simply a newer manifestation of the blackout, and it would be inaccurate 
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to act as if the complete palate of digital authoritarianism has applied—or was ever even 
truly accessible—to most. New Delhi-based digital rights activist Nikhil Pahwa maintains 
this very point: “frankly, let’s call it what it is: It’s still an internet shutdown and a 
blanket censorship of the internet.”198 Pranesh Prakash of Yale’s Information Society 
Project echoes this claim, contending that “the internet shutdown in Kashmir is far worse 
censorship than anywhere in the world. It even surpasses China’s. It is a step toward 
demolishing democracy in India.”199 
For these reasons, Kashmir’s historically unprecedented internet blackout is the 
focus of this thesis’ analysis of digital authoritarianism within this case study.  
Internet shutdowns 
The blackout began the day before Article 370’s revocation: alongside a military-
imposed curfew and hard restriction of movement, phone and internet services were 
severed throughout the valley. With one flip of the kill switch, the Indian government had 
isolated the Kashmiris from not just the outside world, but from each other in an 
environment where security forces could and were arbitrarily torturing and detaining. 
Local journalist Majid Maqbool—one who had not been preemptively taken away at the 
opening of the shutdown—described the effects of losing access to his family in an 
instant:  
It was traumatic, and no date was given for when it might end… My 
parents, who are in their mid 60s, left for the Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca 
two days before communication was cut. They couldn’t speak to us for 
more than a month. For the first time in my life, I couldn’t greet them on 
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the day of Eid. Their once-in-a-lifetime experience was filled with added 
anxieties and worries.200 
 
As mentioned earlier, unlike a scenario in which the internet is simply being filtered, 
there are no workarounds for absolute blocking in this manner. In China, for instance, 
usage of VPNs is a common way to circumvent the Great Firewall and access content 
which the Communist Party has deemed unacceptable. However, for Kashmiris, the 
underlying technology that allows a VPN to mask a user’s identity and connect to a 
foreign server in the first place—the internet itself—was now absent. Short of access to 
government approved connections under constant monitoring, the citizens of Kashmir 
were alone. 
 Indeed, many would ultimately end up scrambling for short sessions of 
connectivity—oftentimes traveling far distances to do so. In what would become 
colloquially known as the “Internet Express,” an 8:15am train out of Srinagar would be 
packed well over intended capacity as hundreds made a day trip out of the valley for the 
opportunity to apply for a passport or renew a driver’s license. Khushboo Yaqoob, a 
sixteen-year-old attempting to apply for a competitive medical exam, was forced to make 
two trips in two days with her mother as lines at her home district headquarters were too 
long: there were a total of four computers for one million people.201 When she was finally 
able to get her application through, she cried. “I was not sure I would ever be able to fill 
it out. Because of the internet ban, I could see my dreams shattering.”202 Yaqoob had 
been preparing for the exam for two years. 
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 Weeks after the shutdown began, Maqbool was one of hundreds of journalists 
who was forced to wait several hours for a few minutes of their own access on one of 
twelve computers. He managed to email his brother and provide a brief update to his 
family, before his parents could return over forty days later. Even once they had returned, 
the pain and fear still lingered:  
Whenever I went to the media centre…I’d download photos of my 
nephew that my brother emailed to show my parents back home on my 
laptop. Seeing him on the screen would moisten their eyes… Every time I 
left home for work, they would worry about not being able to ring me to 
check on me. There was no way I could contact them while I was out. Our 
mobiles were useless, lying in a corner. My mother never forgot to remind 
me to carry my ID card when I left home—just as she had when I was a 
teenager.203 
 
In a region where killings and disappearances could already happen in the blink of an 
eye, the blackout introduced a level of increased uncertainty to a prolonged extent yet to 
be seen in the internet age.  
 On January 25th, the internet ban was partially lifted—with a substantial caveat. 
Those who were now able to connect only able to do so a 2G speeds. In a world already 
transitioning from a 4G to 5G infrastructure, this was as good as nothing for many. Of 
course, that is not to say that there were no benefits to the partial restoration: through 
VPN use—though officially barred by the government under severe consequences under 
the UAPA—there was now an opportunity to reach the outside world relatively 
unfiltered. One student told the Associated Press “they made us silent for six months. 
Now they’ve opened a window. We’ll tell the world what India has done to us.”204 
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 That said, businesses, doctors, and students who relied on the transfer of large 
files and consistent outside communication were largely unable to do their jobs. Within 
Kashmir, for example, shopping online was nearly impossible due to the inordinate 
amount of time it would take to load a picture of the product they sought to buy. For 
those browsing Kashmiri digital retailers outside of the valley, prolonged shipping times 
and inability to see consistently updated stocks—a process loading times made incredibly 
burdensome for business owners in Kashmir—sent them away in droves. “When the 
government imposed an information blackout following the abrogation of K&K’s special 
status, I abruptly lost my customers from the rest of India,” said the owner of one 
boutique. “When I could not operate my business, the customers across India switched to 
other online shopping portals, due to which my business suffered badly… When your 
business gets hit, it brings frustration and depression, and you start cursing yourself.”205 
Even before the partial access was restored, one report estimated that the shutdown had 
already cost the Indian economy—Kashmir included—over $1.3 billion in 2019 alone.206 
As significant as this number was, though, it would be dwarfed by the nearly $3 billion 
loss in 2020.207  
 Even prior to the onset of the COVID-19 epidemic, the medical field was one of 
the sectors of Kashmir most impacted by the shutdown. One urologist from Srinagar had 
been treating a patient in the advanced-stage of pancreatic cancer since July 2019, and 
relied on consultation with specialists in Mumbai for information. The shutdown instantly 
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severed these communications, and the patient died in November. He told The 
Washington Post in December 2019 he was overwhelmed with the knowledge that he 
was unable to do everything possible to potentially save the patient’s life. “What hurts is 
when [the government] claims things are normal,” he added. “This is not normal.”208 An 
understanding of such consequences was shared by doctors across the valley, who in 
normal times were constantly connected and contacting each other through a volunteer 
network of 1,200 on WhatsApp.209  
 When COVID-19 did strike, many of the measures taken around the world were 
simply impossible due to the limitation of local internet speeds. For contact tracing alone, 
doctors had no way to track down those for whom they had received a positive test result. 
Even the Indian government’s own official contact-tracing app was unable to be 
downloaded by residents of Kashmir.210 Healthcare officials were consistently kept out of 
the loop of global knowledge on the pandemic by the crippled internet speeds, as online 
conferences, programs, and medical journals were inaccessible. “It takes hours to 
download an advisory document released by the World Health Organization,” said one 
doctor.211 In spite of these limitations, the Indian government stated firmly in September 
that “the 2G mobile internet speed is not an impediment in COVID control measures 
including dissemination of information to the general public as well as health 
workers.”212 As 2020 drew to a close, the government continued to ban high-speed 
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internet for Kashmir at-large until January 8th, 2021—despite an order from India’s 
Supreme Court to restore services across the territory back in August. 213 
 When framed within the context of the five goals of autocrats, blackouts are 
plainly unable to increase the opportunities for surveillance on their own. However as 
alluded to in the prior section and a topic subject for greater discussion in the final 
chapter, its effects on surveillance may be much greater when combined with other 
authoritarian tactics. Internet shutdowns also have a more complex answer as it relates to 
the spread of misinformation. In short, while it is clear that it cannot possibly spread 
misinformation domestically when there is an inherent absence of communication 
networks to begin with, it is evident that the tactic can help spread misinformation abroad 
as there are few internal sources to effectively counter claims made by the government 
about the affected peoples.  
 The case of Kashmir particularly demonstrates that internet blackouts do not 
legitimize a dominant regime. In fact, Kashmir is far from the only case study that has 
taught this lesson. This was addressed earlier in this analysis, as the theoretical 
framework identified Mubarak as one who learned how such heavy-handed measures can 
delegitimize a regime instead. Nevertheless, stories such as Maqbool’s do prove that fear 
is absolutely another outcome of internet blackouts, and that the tactic can achieve the 
goal of creating it well.  
 However, when viewed in a vacuum, the goal most easily achieved through 
internet blackouts is the elimination of the dissent’s operational capacity. With few local 
voices able to share the true status of Kashmir internationally, the larger global 
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community was kept in the proverbial dark. Furthermore, the types of connective action 
that open up so many new opportunities to modern activists were briskly ripped away by 
the simple flip of the internet kill switch. In short, elimination of the digital presence and 
operational capacity of the Kashmiris’ movement was total and absolute.  





















Table 1. Relative Usage and Effectiveness of Authoritarian Tactics Within Five Goals of Autocrats 
 
 Still, this does not tell the complete story. Blackouts may eliminate protestor’s 
digital operational capacity absolutely, but what about their effects on the dissenters’ 
physical operational capacity? In accordance with the pattern that has clearly emerged in 
this work, the answer lies in the intersection between the tools and tactics of the two main 
autocratic strategies: digital authoritarianism and physical repression. This relationship is 














Till I am alive, I will continue to fight for justice and speak truth to power.214  




 To first address the concluding question of Chapter Five: how has the internet 
blackout affected the physical operational capacity of Kashmir’s dissenters? In bluntest 
terms, it has had an extraordinarily detrimental impact on the movement’s success. This 
may not be immediately apparent when viewing shutdowns in a vacuum as the tactic’s 
most obvious effects are the digital repercussions, but the situation in Kashmir is 
operating within anything but a vacuum. The physical state action that has occurred 
alongside the blackout is part of a larger, calculated, holistic strategy of repression by the 
Indian government, which necessitates that the two be evaluated together.  
 In this vein, one of the most significant takeaways from the past year in Kashmir 
is that, respectively, both physical repression and digital authoritarianism can be made 
devastatingly more effective when implemented together. While the manifestation of this 
process certainly may vary in different regimes around the world—as it should from the 
autocrat’s perspective due to the unique circumstances of each’s situation —India seems 
to have found a successful approach for its specific context. 
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 Prior to revoking Article 370, the Indian government was clear-eyed about how 
the move would exacerbate tensions in an already unstable Kashmir. Removing the 
region’s special—though admittedly limited—autonomous status and incorporating it as 
part of India proper would be the conflict’s most significant development since the 
British partition of the subcontinent. If allowed, pushback from the Kashmiris would 
almost certainly have reached an unprecedented height: failure at this juncture would be 
existential in nature for the potentially free future Kashmir. Such protest would not 
quickly nor easily dissipate, so the crackdown needed to stabilize the population would 
need to be fierce. It is easy to see how this progression of events would be undesirable for 
India, especially considering the country’s perceived status as the “world’s biggest 
democracy” and the inherent sensitivity to international pressure that accompanies the 
title—not to mention the desire to avoid being seen as a risky or unstable trading partner 
as it attempts to more fully integrate itself as a dominant player in the international 
economy.  
 Therefore, preventing this type of direct action before it could ever begin would 
be much more proactive and effective for the government—and the unfolding of August 
2019’s lockdown proved that an internet shutdown was the focal point of this strategy. In 
short, by eliminating the potential for digital, connective action from the outset by 
universally disconnecting internet access, the Indian government created an environment 
where any and all action was forced to occur physically—whether that was as 
comparatively small as meeting in an individual’s home to coordinate or large as 
mobilizing a large group of protestors for a visible demonstration.  
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 For sure, while an internet shutdown can block the valuable opportunities 
afforded to protestors by digital networks, it certainly cannot stop physical direct action 
on its own. However, in an environment without internet, the physical resources and 
operational capacity of the dissent are directly pitted against the physical resources and 
operational capacity of the regime—an uphill battle for the former in most optimistic 
terms. Over the past year, the extent of this challenge has been made apparent by the 
level of repression employed against the Kashmiri people: thousands immediately 
imprisoned (particularly the most influential dissenting voices), a sudden and violent 
freezing of movement across the region, as well as a widespread and growing 
surveillance apparatus that can immediately identify potential and existent direct action. 
Protests may have occurred in more isolated cases from the northernmost border 
approaching Pakistan to the southernmost border near Punjab, but the Indian government 
has been successfully able to limit their size, shorten their length, and exact repercussions 
to a devastatingly effective level.  
 Without internet, the power of the boomerang effect is severely neutered. 215 When 
paired with its ban on international media from entering Kashmir, India’s domestic 
actions significantly limit the amount of information that could reach an international 
audience and shed a light on human rights abuses occurring every day—and with that the 
associated external pressure the boomerang effect can facilitate disappears. This is not to 
mention how the prevalent environment of fear likely did—and still can—suppress the 
stories of those who would otherwise be willing to speak out. When direct action could 
be taken, Kashmiris could not reach the ear of a sympathetic international audience—nor 
 
215 An explanation of the boomerang effect can found on page 8. 
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that of a concerned government. Largely, such action would just invite increased 
oppression moving forward. In effect, Kashmir could only cry out to itself.  
 To be clear, the case of Kashmir does not suggest that internet blackouts can be an 
effective way of eradicating direct action or achieving the regime’s overall goals when 
implemented alone; Mubarak’s downfall in Egypt set the precedent for how internet 
blackouts may actually be detrimental to a regime’s survival in this case when without 
the support of the coercive apparatus. This is not to even mention other states where a 
lack of infrastructural capacity would make this strategy impossible to truly realize. 
Rather, Kashmir’s situation strongly suggests that the tactic can be extraordinarily 
effective within its own niche (eliminating opportunities afforded by digital network) and 
can powerfully augment physically repressive tactics as part of a larger holistic strategy.  
 Consequently, physical repression will continue to be an integral tool in the 
authoritarian toolbox as long as physical and digital repression bolster the other’s 
effectiveness when utilized in combination, and the international costs associated with 
their use do not outweigh the domestic benefits. Frankly, it is difficult to imagine a 
scenario in the short term where either is not bound to be the case. As more countries like 
India continue to refine and demonstrate the effectiveness of their repressive strategies, it 
is seemingly inevitable that the proliferation of the technological infrastructure required 
to fully implement them will allow more leaders across the world to take similar steps. 
Moreover, the relative indifference of Western governments towards taking diplomatic 
action against India’s blatant repression—alongside the willingness of Western 
companies like Ernst and Young to help create autocratic infrastructure—points to the 
likelihood that a shift in attitudes and priorities and attitudes may only occur in the long-
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term—if at all. Without larger forces like COVID forcing India’s hand, for instance, it is 
probable that that concessions it did make in reducing its number of jailed dissenters 
would not have happened at all.  
 This all has significant implications as it relates to the work of Guriev and 
Treisman. Certainly, the empirical evidence creates a compelling argument that global 
trends of violence and physical repression on behalf of authoritarian governments are on 
a downward trend. That said, this top-down view of the issue fails to capture the entire 
story. Internet shutdowns—which would fall under the category of the digital means they 
say autocrats now use to control and manipulate information—create an environment 
where action must happen physically, and these circumstances facilitate state physical 
repression making it not just more common, but considerably more effective as well.  
The symbiosis of this relationship between digital authoritarianism and physical 
repression is even more apparent when viewing the leadup to the events of August 2019: 
how was the government so quickly able to gather the information necessary to target, 
round up, and imprison thousands of Kashmiris in the days before and after August 5th? 
Surely the presence of Kashmir’s dedicated internet police played a role in this regard. It 
is clear that the opportunities afforded by digital authoritarianism—such as co-opting 
social media to track potentially “dangerous” individuals for an eventual mass 
imprisonment—greatly boosted the effectiveness of the ensuing physical repression.  
In short, Guriev and Treisman’s core contention is that modern autocrats have 
learned from the actions and failures of their predecessors, and now predominantly 
choose to manipulate, not intimidate. However, since August 2019, Kashmir provides 
strong evidence that this is not always—nor is it even typically—the case. Accounts from 
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those directly impacted demonstrate that this debate is not simply an argument about the 
semantics of informational autocracy and repression at large: it is a direct contradiction of 
their hypothesis as the actions taken by the Indian government are the exact same type of 
mass, violent, repression that the two claim is being largely abandoned by contemporary 
regimes. Therefore, Guriev and Treisman’s theory may have real merit within a general 
discussion of authoritarian trends, but applying the concept without attentiveness to the 
mixture of regime tactics is problematic. Any assertion of traditional autocratic strategies’ 
obsolescence is dubious and fails to capture the realities being experienced by millions of 
such regimes’ victims.  
Taken altogether, the factors examined in this thesis illuminate a few other points 
of concern. To start, as discussed before, India is a country more responsive to 
international pressure than most due to its status as the “world’s largest democracy” 
and the desire of its government to maintain this reputable status for reasons of prestige, 
diplomacy, and economics. This final point is especially noteworthy considering India’s 
rapid economic ascension across the twentieth and twenty-first century, in large part due 
to its integration within the global markets. If this country is as brazenly open to 
embracing authoritarian strategies as it is under such circumstances, what is the 
deterrent for a less globally integrated state resistant to such pressure—like a 
Turkmenistan, for example—when it gains the capability to implement such strategies? Is 
this danger not amplified when considering the rate at which countries like China and 
Russia seek to export digital authoritarianism? 
To take the discussion of democracy a step further, is it not alarming that a state 
like India can take this type of action and still legitimately call itself a democracy in the 
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eyes of the rest of the world? India cannot have it both ways: if the conflict in Kashmir is 
truly an “internal” issue as it claims, then the territory is being controlled through 
indisputable authoritarian rule. With local elections unable to manifest the will of the 
people, thousands unduly and lengthily detained without trial, and killings and torture 
weaponized indiscriminately, Kashmir in no way resembles a healthy, functional 
democracy. Perhaps this necessitates the need for the global community to reexamine its 
measures of what democracy, authoritarianism, and repression truly mean, as well as 
what the free world is willing to deem acceptable when characterizing states in these 
terms. 
Conclusion 
 By conceptualizing modern dictators as “informational autocrats,” Guriev and 
Treisman present a largely compelling argument that violence and physical repression are 
actively being -forgone in favor of manipulating information to the masses and gaining 
the support—or at least not losing it—of the state’s elite. However, while that may be 
generally true from a purely empirical standpoint, the past sixteen months in Kashmir is 
proof that statistics can often fail to capture the full reality of circumstances on the 
ground. As much as almost any other country in the world, India has an extensive array 
of digital tools available at its disposal. Yet, as the Kashmiris have painfully discovered, 
this access has not supplanted the traditional modes of state repression physically used 
against them from their earliest days under imperial rule.  
Instead, digital authoritarianism has combined with physical repression in a way 
that is simply unprecedented for a professed democracy. Alone, each of the outlined 
authoritarian tactics sees varied results in achieving the five main goals of longevity-
 104 
minded autocratic regime. Implemented together, digital and physical repression can be 
devastatingly effective at preventing direct action and preserving the regime in the face of 
dissent. The symbiotic nature of this relationship shows little sign of diminishing, and the 
result is a grim outlook for future dissent movements if current developments continue to 
be left unchecked.  
Taken together, the findings of this thesis point to several fascinating and pressing 
directions for future research on the subject. At the global level, how does the prevalence 
of other digitally authoritarianist tactics such as filtering and flooding contribute to the 
use and effectiveness of physical repression by the state against protestors? As mentioned 
before, Kashmir’s internet blackout created an environment where use of additional 
digital authoritarianism was effectively impossible. As internet speeds in the valley are 
increased from 2G and the internet becomes more widely accessible, Kashmir itself 
remains a valuable case for study—though the list of other relevant situations must be 
extensive as well.  
Furthermore, the unfolding of events in Kashmir strongly indicate that without 
external drivers of change like COVID-19, India would most likely have continued down 
its initial track with tactics such as indefinite, legally dubious imprisonment. Therefore, 
for those concerned with the global preservation of human rights, it would be 
extraordinarily valuable to examine the leverage that the rest of the world has at its 
disposal to drive change in India—as well as any other country which utilizes digital 
authoritarianism as a central mean of repression. India’s embeddedness within the world 
economy and its aspirations for a greater global role demand particular attention in this 
regard, and perhaps one immediate step the United States could take is curbing its recent 
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calls for an Indian seat on the United Nations Security Council. Activists may benefit 
from actively lobbying their respective governments to take such hardline stances, and in 
essence they would be accelerating the process of the widely recognized boomerang 
effect. In addition, analyzing how Western private actors like Ernst and Young help 
facilitate digital authoritarianism would be an especially useful contribution due to the 
relative ease in which liberalized governments could exert pressure on their domestic 
corporations.  
The road ahead for Kashmir will likely continue to be difficult. With American 
polarization accelerating at unsustainable levels, Europe only just entering its post-Brexit 
phase, and COVID-19 posing the greatest international crisis in generations, global 
attention has been thoroughly diverted from the most militarized region of the world—
despite the significance of its own developments. That said, the history of the Kashmiris’ 
experience under oppressive rule proves that while the current moment may be new, it is 
not fundamentally unique in nature. International support is unmistakably needed in order 
to finally achieve peace in the valley, but the fervor and persistence of the resistance 
should not be underestimated. Kashmir will continue persevere, and like any cat-and-
mouse conflict, dissenters will discover new ways to counter India’s repressive tactics. In 
the meantime, it is the moral obligation of the rest of the world’s peacekeepers to 
contextualize the circumstances that created the current situation, analyze the most 
efficient short-term solutions, and determine how to prevent this weaponization of digital 
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